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Resumo 
Nos anos mais recentes foram diversos os autores que contribuíram para a literatura 
sobre diferenças entre empresas estrangeiras e domésticas. No entanto muitos destes 
estudos tem o seu foco nas diferenças de produtividade e rentabilidade, enquanto que o 
objetivo deste estudo é abranger um maior número de características e identificar as 
devidas diferenças bem como não apenas compara empresas estrangeiras com as 
empresas domésticas mas dividir estas últimas em dois grupos: empresas domésticas 
sem investimento direto estrangeiro e com investimento direto estrangeiro. Para além 
disso esta dissertação foca-se no caso Português onde o objetivo é testar hipóteses 
geradas com base na literatura e gerar conclusões através de resultados empíricos. 
A base teórica desta dissertação são as teorias de Negócios Internacionais tais como o 
conceito de vantagem de Hymer, o Paradigma Eclético, entre outras. A parte empírica 
utiliza dados extraídos da base de dados SABI e a parte econométrica utiliza regressões 
Pooled linear simples para verificar a existência de diferenças entre os diferentes tipos 
de empresas em análise.  
Os resultados são inequívocos: as empresas estrangeiras são mais produtivas, rentáveis,  
pagam salários maiores, são maiores e é maís provável que sejam exportadoras do que 
as empresas domésticas sem investimento direto estrangeiro. Os resultados demonstram 
também que as empresas domésticas multinacionais são mais produtiva, rentáveis e 
maiores que as empresas estrangeiras. 
Este estudo e os seus resultados proporcionam uma visão geral do panorama Português 
de negócios e pode ser utilizado para análise de políticas a implementar nesta área. 
 
 
 
Palavras Chave: Negócios Internacionais, Diferenças Características, Empresas 
Estrangeiras, Empresas Domésticas, Multinacionais, Subsidiárias, Portugal. 
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Abstract 
In recent years, several authors contributed to the literature about differences between 
Foreign Owned and Domestic Owned companies. However these studies were mainly 
focused on productivity and profitability differences. The goal of the present study is to 
do that but also to cover more characteristics and identify what are the differences in 
those characteristics as well as not only compare Foreign Owned with Domestic Owned 
companies but also split the Domestic Owned companies into two groups: Domestic 
without FDI and Domestic with FDI. Moreover, this dissertation focuses on Portugal, 
and has the aim of testing postulated hypotheses derived from the literature, and 
generating empirical results. The theoretical background for this dissertation is based on 
International Business theories, such as Hymer’s concept of advantage, the Eclectic 
Framework, among others. The empirical part used data extracted from the SABI 
database, and the methodology include an econometric study using Pooled OLS and 
OLS regressions to test the existence of characteristic differences between the different 
types of firms under analysis.  
The results are unequivocal: FO are more productive, profitable, pay higher wages, 
larger and more likely exporters than DO. However when comparing FO and DOM the 
results show unequivocal that DOM are more productive, profitable and larger than FO. 
This study, and its results, provide a general insight into the Portuguese business 
landscape, in terms of the distinct groups of firms, and may be useful as an instrument 
for the analysis and policy making in this area 
 
 
 
Keywords:  International Business; Characteristic Differences; Foreign Owned; Domestic Owned; 
Foreign Multinational Subsidiaries; Portugal. 
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 1 
Introduction  
The economic globalization process has been driven by multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) to a very large degree (Kleinert, 2001). 
Traditionally, the literature in International Business (IB) assumes that there are 
important differences between foreign multinational subsidiaries and domestic firms. 
Relevant theories (Hymer 1960/1976; Dunning, 1977, cited in Dunning 2000) support 
the idea that MNEs must have a competitive advantage over their local counterparts in 
order for foreign direct investment (FDI) to occur. 
More recently, various authors have corroborated, conceptually and empirically, that 
these differences are a fact. In the Belgian case, De Baecker & Sleuwaegen (2001) 
concluded that foreign firms are significantly more productive than domestic firms. 
They go even further affirming that “large differences in productivity between foreign 
firms and domestic firms exist even after controlling for other firm characteristics put 
forward by theoretical models formalizing heterogeneity between firms”. (p.1) 
Bellak (2004) argued that performance gaps between foreign owned (FO) versus 
domestic owned (DO) firms can be noticed in variables such as productivity, 
technology, profitability, wages, skills and growth.  
The superior performance of foreign ownership in comparison with domestic ownership 
would not surprise when the FO firm is from a developed country and the host country 
is a developing country (Willmore, 1986). However, FO firms tend to reveal superior 
performance even in comparison with their domestic counterparts in developed 
countries. These differences are related not only with ownership but also with firm 
characteristics - such as size, age, industry, capital intensity and R&D (Bellak, 2004).  
In spite of the acknowledged differences, there are not many empirical studies in this 
matter, particularly in the Portuguese case (an exception being Cardoso, 2008 – that in 
any case had a narrower focus than the present study, as it set only to study performance 
differences, and that was based on a much more specific literature on performance). 
This scarcity, and the opportunity to add to this literature, motivates this study. 
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The present study aims to go deeper and to analyze what are the main differences in the 
characteristics between FO and Portuguese owned companies (DO and DOM). Even in 
the recent literature about differences between FO and DO firms, the focus of analysis 
tends to be on productivity/performance, leaving often other variables unattended. This 
scarcity, and the opportunity to add to this literature, motivates this study. As well as the 
opportunity to verify if there are or not substantial differences between both, in the 
Portuguese case, that is an under-researched setting. 
The characteristics under analysis in this study will be Productivity, Profitability, 
Exporter, Size, Wages. Comparing these characteristics between FO and DO firms we 
can identify the importance that foreign ownership represents in all of them, as well to 
identify how they can be correlated. 
Having these motivations in mind, the main aims of this dissertation are: 
(i) To review the most relevant theories that may refer to, or explain, the differences 
in characteristics between FO and DO firms.  
(ii) To conduct a thorough analysis of the conceptual/theoretical and of the empirical 
literature on this theme.  
(iii) Bearing on the relevant theoretical frameworks and extant literature, to 
formulate hypotheses on the likely differences in the characteristics of 
foreign subsidiaries and Portuguese domestic firms. 
(iv) To conduct an empirical application, based on a large scale dataset taken from 
the SABI database (Bureau Van Dijk, 2014). It will be used, first of all, to 
identify and take stock of the characteristics of FO and DO firms in Portugal 
(i.e. first, in a descriptive manner) and, after that, to test econometrically the 
determinants of the foreign versus domestic ownership (using a pooled 
regression model).  
 
The main research question underlying this dissertation is:  
“Are there significant differences in the characteristics of FO and DO companies, in the 
Portuguese case?”  
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“Are there significant differences in the characteristics of FO and DOM companies, in 
the Portuguese case?” 
Going even further, and following De Baecker and Slewaegen’s (2001) suggestion, our 
analysis will divide Portuguese firms into two types: multinationals (i.e., Portuguese-
owned firms with FDI/subsidiaries abroad) and domestic firms (Portuguese firms 
without FDI abroad).
1
 This will allow the identification of the characteristics and 
respective differences between foreign subsidiaries and each of the latter two categories. 
This will be a relevant development relative to extant works in this area (even the 
already cited work by Cardoso, 2008, that had a substantially narrower focus, and was 
based on a different dataset, did not distinguish the two types of Portuguese firms).  
                                                 
11
 This is a very important distinction that has gained increasing acceptance in the literature. It considers 
the existence of foreign subsidiaries as the distinctive factor. Firms with less committed entry modes 
(such as exports and/or contractual forms) are not considered, naturally, as Portuguese multinationals. 
They are included in the domestic firms, even if they may conduct (non-proprietary, non-investment 
related) operations abroad. This distinction is key, and we use the accepted perspective employed in the 
most relevant literature. 
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Chapter 1 – Theoretical Background and Literature review 
1.1 - Key Concepts 
To develop this study it is necessary to clarify some concepts as Multinationals, Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), Domestic Firms and Foreign Affiliates. 
According to Dunning and Lundan (2008, p.3), “A multinational enterprise is an 
enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) and owns, in some way, 
controls value-added activities in more than one country”.  
In the World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2007, p.245), “Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) is defined as an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a 
lasting interest and control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor 
or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the 
foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate)”. “The 
lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct 
investor and the direct investment enterprise and a significant degree of influence on 
the management of the enterprise. The direct or indirect ownership of 10% or more of 
the voting power of an enterprise resident in one economy by an investor resident in 
another economy is evidence of such a relationship” (OECD, 2008; p. 234). 
Portuguese-owned Firms are all companies which their ownership is Portuguese (less 
than 10% of foreign capital). However, it is necessary to distinguish Domestic Firms 
(DO) and Domestic Multinationals (DOM). Domestic Firms are those Portuguese-
owned companies that not have FDI abroad, while Domestic Multinationals are those 
Portuguese-owned firms with FDI (i.e. affiliates established) abroad. As already 
mentioned, this is the usual distinction in the literature (see for example De Baecker and 
Slewaegen’s, 2001; Iyer, 2009). Doms and Jensen (1998) argued that this distinction 
should be made in order that, when comparing domestic owned companies with foreign 
owned subsidiaries do not compare “apples and oranges”. However in this study, firms 
that export or have contractual forms but do not have affiliates, industrial or 
commercial, abroad will be considered Domestic Firms.  
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A Foreign Affiliate, according to UNCTAD (2007: p. 245) “is an incorporated or 
unincorporated enterprise in which an investor, who is a resident in another economy, 
owns a stake that permits a lasting interest in the management of that enterprise (an 
equity stake of 10% for an incorporated enterprise, or its equivalent for an 
unincorporated enterprise)”. 
1.2 - Theoretical Background 
1.2.1 - The concept of advantage 
The concept of advantage is key to the present analysis. In this vein, the seminal 
contribution was that of Hymer (1960/1976). He argued that FDI involves the transfer 
of different resources such as technology, management skills, entrepreneurship, 
marketing and so on. Hymer argued that a firm must possess specific advantages 
(innovation, cost, financial or marketing) to compensate the disadvantages of competing 
in a foreign unfamiliar environment (cultural, political and economic differences), i.e. 
their “costs of foreignness”. In a related manner, other authors referred that firms face 
costs implied by their liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) and the geographical 
coordination of the activities, hence they must have distinctive advantages that allow to 
surpass these extra costs (Dunning and Lundan, 2008) of operating in foreign markets, 
as problems due the spatial distance, communications and transportation barriers. 
1.2.2 - The OLI Paradigm 
Dunning argued that FDI is associated with the capability of the firms to explore some 
of their specific advantages in another country (Dunning, 1988). The author identifies, 
in the OLI Paradigm, specific advantages related to ownership, location and 
internalization. The OLI paradigm does not intend to be a theory of the MNE per se, but 
a conceptual framework for explaining “what is”, rather than “what should be “, the 
level and structure of the foreign value activities of enterprises.(Dunning and Lundan, 
2008) Summarized, the paradigm argues that FDI will only occur if firms have 
simultaneously three types of advantages (OLI). Ownership advantages (O) are related 
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with the assets, not only tangible but also intangible, that are unique and that confer a 
competitive advantage to the firm. Location advantages (L) are connected with a 
specific location that means a specific advantage, i.e, it is more advantageous for the 
firm to perform certain activities abroad than in the home country. Internalization 
advantages (I) are associated with the need of the firms to preserve the value chain “in 
doors” in order to protect their ownership advantages.  
For the aims of this study, the Ownership advantages are the most relevant, given that 
we intend to measure the impact of ownership in the different characteristics of the 
identified firm cohorts. The Ownership specific advantages are the most difficult and 
critical to deal with from the OLI paradigm (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). The O 
advantages reflect “the resources and capabilities of the home countries of the investing 
firms; and that FDI would only occur when the benefits of exploiting, i.e. adding value 
to, these advantages from a foreign location outweighed the opportunity costs of so 
doing”(Dunning, 2000; p 168). They are critical because are “a necessary precondition 
for domestic firms to become MNEs “(Gelübcke, 2013a, p.1566).  
1.2.3 - OLI - Ownership Advantages 
Dunning (1988), distinguishes two kinds of ownership advantages: those related to the 
assets (tangible or intangible) (Oa) and those with transactions (Ot). While the former 
are advantages that result from the different assets that a firm posses, the latter mirror 
the transactional benefits of common governance these assets in a multinational 
network. Oa includes the specific firms` know how related to production management, 
organizational systems, innovatory capacity, organization of work and so on. Ot results 
mainly from size, product diversity, learning experience, favored access to inputs or 
markets, access to resources of parental company at marginal cost and synergetic 
economies related with the multinational network. The success of firms abroad will be 
as high as its capabilities and abilities to exploit these ownership advantages. 
In Dunning and Lundan (2008), the authors examine even another type of Ownership 
advantage related to institutions (formal or informal) (Oi) distinct from the asset and 
transaction based advantages. The firms would need strong institutions because many 
decisions nowadays need to be made based on discretion and incorporate issues related 
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with corporate social responsibility. The Oi advantages are related to “the formal and 
informal institutions that govern the value-added processes within the firm, and 
between its stakeholders” (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; p. 101). Some components of Oi 
reflect the specific corporate culture (intra firm) while other are more influenced by the 
norms and values of where the firm conduct its activities (extra firm). It is important not 
to misunderstand Oa with Oi. Although both have an internal perspective Oi has an 
external perspective too, and while Oa is related to changes in services or products the 
Oi is influenced for shifts in values which may or may not be related with the products 
or services that the firm offers (Dunning and Lundan, 2008).  
1.2.4 - Internalization 
A relevant contribution is also Internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976). This 
theory intends to explain why Multinationals exists comparing cross border transaction 
organized by hierarchies, i.e MNEs, and by markets. The MNEs` activities imply 
coordination costs, whereas transfers by market imply transactions costs. Coordination 
costs are those related to managing that are activities geographically dispersed. So, the 
main conclusion of this theory is that when transactions costs are higher than 
coordination costs, which justifies why firms coordinate transnational activities, within 
their organization, instead of doing it through the market. In other words, MNEs exist 
when hierarchies are more efficient than the market in the coordination of transnational 
activities. 
This conclusion is an important theoretical building block in the analysis of foreign 
ownership, because it explains why there are foreign companies competing in 
international markets. For the aims of this study the concept of cross border costs will 
be used to compare FO firms with Portuguese owned firms with FDI and even to 
compare FO firms with Portuguese owned firms without FDI. 
1.2.5 - Resource-based view 
Other relevant theory, a more recent theoretical perspective of IB, is the resource-based 
view (RBV) of the firm that derives from Penrose’s seminal work (1959) (cited in 
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Wernerfelt, 1984). This theory argues that firms` competitive advantages are based on 
tangible and intangible resources, which are difficult or costly for other firms obtain. 
These resources must be VRIN - valuable, rare, inimitable, and not substitutable 
(Barney, 1991). The firm should not just possess but try to increase assets with these 
characteristics in order to build a sustainable competitive advantage over its 
competitors. In other words, the growth of a firm is directly related to its capability to 
accumulate VRIN resources. These resources can be physical, financial, human, and 
organizational, so on and influence the firm`s characteristics, as size, wages, 
productivity and other performance measures.  
The RBV identifies the “international knowledge and experience as a valuable, unique, 
and hard-to-imitate resource that differentiates the winners from the losers and mere 
survivors in global competition (Peng, 2001). This corroborates the idea of recent 
authors (see Bellak, 2004) that multinationality is competitive advantage per se.  
1.2.6 - Knowledge-based view and dynamic capabilities 
The knowledge based view (KBV) is a related theoretical approach that has gained 
increased relevance in the IB. Literature of the KBV is an evolution of the RBV and 
considers knowledge as the most important and strategically significant resource of a 
firm because resources based on knowledge are almost value, rare and difficult to 
imitate (Grant, 1996) what means sustained competitive advantages and a superior 
performance (Deeds and Decarolis, 1999). 
The knowledge generated by companies can be tacit or explicit articulated and this will 
influence the form through which it will be transferred. The tacit knowledge is inherent 
to the company, so more difficult to transfer by market and more efficiently transferred 
within the firm, what can justify the existence of MNEs (Kogut and Zander, 1993). 
Knowledge creation and transfer tend to arise within hierarchical organizations, what 
means MNE existence, and “the decision to transfer technology within the firm or in the 
market can be explained by the attributes of knowledge that constitute the ownership 
advantage of the firm. A firm is a repository of knowledge that consists of how 
information is coded and action coordinated. The mode by which technology is 
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transferred, e.g., within the firm or by licensing to other parties, is influenced by the 
characteristics of the advantage that motivates the growth of the firm across borders” 
(Kogut and Zander, 1993; p.626).  
The specific advantages of MNEs are also highlighted in the dynamic capabilities 
framework (Teece et al, 1997). These competitive advantages are “seen as distinctive 
processes (ways of coordinating and combining), shaped by the firm's (specific) asset 
positions (such as the firm's portfolio of difficult-to-trade knowledge assets and 
complementary assets), and the evolution path(s) it has adopted or inherited” (Teece et 
al, 1997, p.509 ).  
MNEs’ specific advantages can explain the differences in characteristics between FO 
and DO firms, however, can also be related with the difference between Domestic Firms 
and Domestic Multinationals (see Bellak, 2004). Pfaffermayr and Bellak (2000) argue 
that some gaps between firms are more related with being part of a multinational 
network than specifically with foreign ownership. 
1.3 – Considerations on theoretical background 
All theories cited above help to understand why FO firms may have different 
characteristics when compared with DO firms. 
There are essential factors such as competition, market structure, barriers to entry, that 
tend to lead to differences between FO and DO firms. FOs tend to, and need to, have 
ownership-specific advantages in order to differentiate them and overcome intrinsic 
disadvantages vis-à-vis their domestic owned counterparts. FO firms have more 
incentives for internalization because they operate across borders and need to manage 
more complex systems.  
FOs tend to benefit from belonging to a multinational network and from the advantages 
that this confers. Being part of this network can be the main explanation to better 
performance than the ownership status per se.  
Taking into consideration the fact that firm-specific characteristics are the main source 
of firms’ heterogeneity, several empirical studies have studied how different are FO 
firms from their domestic counterparts. The following section aims to review these 
studies, presenting a summary of the relevant findings. 
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1.4 - Literature review: on Differences between FO and DO 
firms 
MNEs have a crucial rule in economic globalization, which has raised the academic and 
public interest about them (Gelübcke, 2013a). Even for policy- makers, the differences 
between FO and DO firms are a point of interest. Assuming the superior performance of 
FO over DO (the result of most empirical studies), it could be hypothesized that policy-
makers should focus in attracting foreign affiliates in order to raise the average 
performance of the total economy. Nonetheless, the performance differences can be 
related not exactly with foreign ownership but with differences in firms’ characteristics 
(Bellak, 2004). 
More recently, various authors have corroborated, conceptually and empirically, that 
that there are important differences between foreign multinational subsidiaries and 
domestic firms. However, conflicting results can be found, as explained subsequently. 
This section will present a summary of empirical studies analyzing the differences in the 
characteristics under analysis between FO and Portuguese owned firms. This review 
splits the studies and their findings according to the main characteristics that this study 
intends to analyze. 
1.4.1 - Productivity  
As referred to before, de Backer & Sleuwaegen (2001) concluded that foreign firms are 
significantly more productive than domestic firms, in the Belgian case, what is 
explained by scale and technical efficiency differences. The authors have distinguished 
the Belgian firms in two types: single nation Belgian owned firms and Belgian MNE. 
When these two groups are compared to foreign subsidiaries they found that the later 
are significantly more productive than single nation Belgian owned firms, but the 
productivity differences to Belgian MNE are not so significant, what shows the 
heterogeneity of Belgian firms. 
Adenaeuer and Heckelei (2011), that analyzed the relevance of ownership in the 
European agribusiness sector, had found that MNEs are more productive. Barbosa and 
Louri (2005) argued that performance differences, in the Portuguese case are not 
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primarily related to ownership. Ownership is only significant when firms in the upper 
quantiles of gross profits are compared, in which case FO firms revealed significantly 
better performance than their DO counterparts. Iyer (2009) compares productivity in 
India of foreign MNEs, Indian MNEs, domestic firms which export and domestic firms 
which sell only at home. He concludes that Indian MNCs have higher productivity than 
foreign MNCs, followed by domestic firms which exports and finally domestic firms 
which only sell at home. In an analyses of the bank sector in, Poland, Havrylchyk 
(2006) concluded that FO banks exhibit higher productivity their inputs than DO banks. 
In a recent cross country analysis of 15 Latin American countries (Chang and Van 
Marrewijk, 2013), that differentiate four kind of companies (National Domestic, 
National Exporter, Foreign Domestic and Foreign Exporter), the authors have found a 
clear foreign ownership productivity premium, which means that foreign companies 
tend to be more productive than domestic owned companies. The authors go even 
further arguing that companies with higher foreign ownership intensity are more 
productive.  
Pfaffermayr and Bellak (2000) examine performance gaps among FO and DO Austrian 
firms. They concluded that “direct positive effect of participating in a foreign MNE's 
network can mainly be found in productivity and profitability. Gaps concerning the 
investment propensity and growth are primarily explained by firm characteristics rather 
than foreign ownership” (p.31). This conclusion is supported by Jungnickel and Keller 
(2003), arguing that structural characteristics as size can have impact in firm`s 
productivity. Both conclusion support the relevance, of the present study, in analysing 
the differences of the characteristics between FO and DO firms. 
Some authors have compared not only FO with DO firms, but also FO with DO MNEs. 
This kind of comparison shows different results: Doms and Jensen (1998) argue that FO 
firms are more productive than general DO firms, however they are less productive 
when compared only with U.S.-owned MNEs. Temouri et al. (2008) found that foreign 
firms in Germany are in general more productive than domestic firms, but while 
“German non-MNEs are less productive than FO firms, there is no such difference 
between German MNEs and FO affiliates” (p.49). These authors have even found that 
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location in Germany is related to the gap between foreign and domestic owned 
companies (the gap is higher in Eastern than Western Germany).  
In a study that focuses on Japanese companies, Murakami (2005), found that firms who 
engage in international activities, i.e FDI and exports, are more productive. In spite this, 
he has found that firms that only export show higher productivity than those that engage 
in FDI. 
We can find also several studies that lead to inconclusive results, i.e that had not found 
significant differences in productivity between FO and DO firms (Globerman et al, 
1994) or even studies that found differences but could not directly relate them to the 
ownership (Blomström, 1988). 
Criscuolo and Martin (2009) suggest that productivity gaps can also be related with the 
country of origin (see Gelübcke, 2013a). They found that “U.K. MNEs are less 
productive than U.S. affiliates, but as productive as non-U.S. foreign affiliates” (p. 263). 
There are results that found gaps even between FO firms. Firms with majority foreign 
ownership are more productive than firms with minority foreign ownership (Dimelis 
and Louri, 2002). This conclusion suggests that ownership have an important rule in 
terms of firm`s productivity. Also in this line of research, Khawar, (2003), found a 
strong direct effect of firm-level foreign investment on the productivity of individual 
firms.  
In the literature about foreign acquisitions (Karpaty, P. 2007; Girma, et al, 2006.), we 
can find conclusions indicating that ownership, per se, can have a positive and 
significant effect on firm performance. This means that domestic companies tend to be 
more productive after being acquired by foreign owned companies. 
Girma, et al. (2004) studied the differences only between domestic companies, 
distinguishing those in three groups: domestic exporters, domestic non-exporters and 
domestic multinationals. The results shows that the performance of domestic 
multinationals is superior that the other two groups whereas, among the other two were 
not possible to identify conclusive results. This point to the importance, in terms of 
performance, in this case measured by productivity, of being part of a multinational 
network. 
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Table 1. Productivity Literature Review: A Synthesis 
Author (Year) 
Sample  
(Years) 
Country 
Focus 
Research Focus 
concerning FO vs DO 
firms 
Methodology 
FO vs 
DO 
firms 
Gelübcke, 2013b 
304471 
Observations 
(2007-2008) 
Germany 
The performance of FO 
in German 
manufacturing: 
evidence from a new 
database  
Cross -
section; t-test; 
Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test 
FO (+) 
Gelübcke, 2013a 
33922 - 41292 
Observations  
(2007-2008) 
Germany 
FO and firm 
performance in German 
services. 
OLS ; t-test; 
K-S- test 
FO (+) 
Chang and 
Marrewijk, 2013 
 10930 
Observations 
(2006) 
Latin 
America 
Firm heterogeneity and 
development: Evidence 
from Latin American 
countries 
SLR ; K-S 
test; t-test 
FO (+) 
Adenaeuer  and 
Heckelei, 2011 
 2001 firms 
(2008) 
Europe 
FDI and the 
performance of EU 
agribusiness firms 
binary-choice 
approach; 
Kaiser–
Meyer–Olkin 
test 
FO (+) 
Temouri et al, 2008 
 10343 firms 
(1995-2004) 
Germany 
Analysis of 
productivity differences 
among FO and DO 
firms: Evidence from 
Germany 
Olley and 
Pakes 
approach 
FO (+) 
Havrylchyk, 2006 
136 Banks 
(1997-2001) 
Poland 
Efficiency of the Polish 
banking industry: FO 
vs DO banks 
Tobit 
regression 
FO (+) 
de Backer and 
Sleuwaegen,  2005 
22452 Firms  
(1990-1995) 
Belgium 
A closer look at the 
productivity advantage 
of FO firms 
stochastic 
frontier 
methodology ; 
OLS 
FO (+) 
Griffith et al, 2004 
1662824 
Establishments 
(1998-2001) 
UK 
FO and productivity: 
New evidence from the 
service sector and the 
R&D lab 
Index 
Comparison 
FO (+) 
Griffith and 
Simpson, 2003 
12900-10457 
Establishments  
(1980-1996) 
UK 
Characteristics of FO 
firms in British 
manufacturing 
OLS; F-test FO (+) 
Khawar, 2003 
2362 
Observations 
(1990) 
Mexico 
Productivity and FDI - 
Evidence from Mexico 
OLS ; t-test FO (+) 
Girma et al, 2002 
460 firms  
(1989-1994) 
UK 
Why are Productivity 
and Wages Higher in 
FO Firms 
Panel 
regression ; t- 
test 
FO (+) 
Pfaffermayr 
and Bellak, 2000 
536 Firms 
(1996-1999) 
Austria 
Why FO firms are 
different : a conceptual 
framework and 
empirical evidence for 
Austria 
Kruskal-
Wallis Test, 
OLS 
FO (+) 
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Koirala  and 
Koshal, 2000 
1021 Firms 
(1992) 
Nepal 
Productivity and 
technology in Nepal: An 
analysis of foreign and 
domestic firms 
OLS; TSLS FO (+) 
Ramstetter, 1999  1970-1996 Asia 
Comparisons of FO and 
DO in asian 
manufacturing over time 
Means 
Comparison 
FO (+) 
Oulton,  1998 
40113 firms 
(1995) 
UK 
Labour Productivity and 
FO in the UK 
OLS FO (+) 
Boardman et al, 
1997 
350 
Corporations  
(1986-1991) Canada 
The role of agency costs 
in explaining the superior 
performance of foreign 
MNCs OLS FO(+) 
Howenstine and 
Zeile 1994 
11934 
Establishments  
(1989-1990) 
USA 
Characteristics of FO 
U.S. Manufacturing 
Establishments 
Simple 
comparison 
FO (+) 
Blomstrom, 1988 
215 Firms 
(1970) 
Mexico 
Labor productivity 
differences between FO 
and DO firms in Mexico 
OLS FO (+) 
 Willmore, 1986 
282 Firms 
(1978-1983) 
Brazil 
The Comparative 
Performance of FO and 
DO Firms in Brazil 
Matched 
Pairs 
FO (+) 
Girma et al, 2004 
1200 Plants 
(2000) 
Ireland 
Exports, international 
investment, and plant 
performance: Evidence 
from a non-parametric 
test 
First order 
stochastic 
dominance; 
K-S test 
FO(+) 
de Backer and 
Sleuwaegen,  2001 
25190 
Observations 
(1990-1995) 
Belgium 
Why are FO more 
productive than DO 
firms? 
Panel data; 
Stochastic 
frontier 
approach 
FO(+) 
Temouri et 
al,  2008 
10343 Firms 
(1995-2004) 
Germany 
Analysis of Productivity 
Differences among FO 
and DO Firms: Evidence 
from Germany  
Levinsohn 
and Petrin 
(2003) 
extended 
Olley 
andPakes 
(1996)  
approach ; 
OLS 
FO MNE 
are more 
productive 
than DO, 
but there 
are not 
significant 
differences 
between 
FO MNE 
and DO 
MNE 
 Iyer, 2009 
112 Firms 
(1989-2004) 
India 
Indian MNEs, foreign 
MNEs and domestic 
firms 
Levinson–
Petrin 
method 
Indian 
MNCs 
have 
higher 
productivit
y than 
foreign 
MNCs. 
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Doms and 
Jensen, 1998 
115000 
Observations 
(1987-1988) 
USA 
Comparing Wages, 
Skills, and 
Productivity between 
DO and FO: 
Manufacturing 
Establishments in the 
United States 
Compare 
averages; 
Regression 
Linear Model 
FO more 
productive than 
DO. DO MNEs 
more productive 
than FO MNEs 
Criscuolo and 
Martin, 2009 
19000 firms  
(1996-2000) 
UK 
MNEs and U.S. 
productivity 
leadership: Evidence 
from Great Britain 
Olley and 
Pakes 
approach and 
assume that  
evolves as a 
first-order 
Markov 
process 
MNEs are less 
productive than 
U.S. affiliates, 
but as productive 
as non-U.S. 
foreign affiliates.  
Karpaty, 
2007 
 3834 Firms 
(1986-2002 
Sweden 
Productivity effects of 
foreign acquisitions in 
Swedish 
manufacturing: The 
FDI productivity issue 
revisited 
OLS;  
Matched 
Pairs 
Foreign 
acquisitions 
increase the 
productivity 
Girma et al, 
2006 
 542 Firms 
(1988-1996) 
UK 
International 
acquisitions, domestic 
competition and firm 
performance 
GMM 
It finds evidence 
of significant 
positive 
productivity 
effects following 
acquisition 
Yeaple,  2005 Model  Model 
A simple model of 
firm heterogeneity, 
international trade, and 
wages 
Model 
Exporting firms  
appear to be 
more productive 
than firms that do 
not export. 
Murakami, 
2005 
 68369 
Observations 
(1994-1998) 
Japan 
Are multinational 
enterprises more 
productive? A test of 
the selection 
hypothesis 
Mean and 
STD 
comparison 
Firms which 
engage in FDI 
display the 
highest 
productivity. 
Bellak, 2004 Review 
Review 
literature 
How DO and FO firms 
differ and why does it 
matter? 
Review 
literature 
Gaps strongly 
points to the 
importance of 
factors related to 
the 
multinationality. 
Castellani 
and Zanfei, 
2003 
3932 Firms 
(1992-1997) 
France 
Spain 
Italy 
Technology gaps, 
absorptive capacity 
and the impact of 
inward investments on 
productivity of 
European firms 
Longitudinal 
firm-level 
data; OLS 
regression 
with standard 
errors robust 
to 
heteroschedas
ticity 
FO firms are not 
always more 
productive than 
DO. France, on 
average, DO 
firms are more 
productive. 
Source: Own elaboration based on literature review 
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Having in mind the literature about productivity differences between FO and DO firms, 
this study will assume that, in the Portuguese case, FO firms are more productive than 
their DO counterparts. Besides that, different studies present conclusions allowing us to 
hypothesize that DOM firms are more productive than DO firms: 
H1.1: FO firms more productive than DOM and DO firms.  
H1.2: DOMs are more productive than DO firms. 
1.4.2 - Profitability 
In a recent study about the German services sector Gelübcke (2013a) compared the 
foreign owned affiliates with German owned affiliates and concluded that although 
foreign affiliates consistently perform better than German affiliates, in terms o 
profitability happens the opposite.  The same author developed a similar study for the 
German manufacturing sector and found that German companies do not differ in terms 
of profitability comparing to FO firms (Gelübcke, 2013b). 
Aydin et al, (2007) analyzed the financial performance of FO and DO in the Turkish 
stock market. The conclusion was that in respect of Return on Assets (ROA) the FO 
firms had better performance than their domestic counterpart. They propose two reasons 
for this: “One reason might be ability to monitor or control or give incentives for 
managers leading manage a firm more seriously and avoiding initiatives reducing the 
corporate values. Another one would be transferring new technology by foreign firms 
generating savings on operating expenses.” (p. 109) 
Using a micro panel data of firms located in Japan, Kimura and Kiyota (2007), examine 
differences in static and dynamic corporate performance between FO and DO firms. 
They found that FO firms reflect superior static characteristics and grow faster in terms 
of profitability. 
Qian et al (2003) used a sample that included MNEs, domestic firms and hybrid firms (a 
mix between MNEs and domestic firms). The study concluded that MNEs are more 
profitable than both other 2 groups of firms. Ramstetter (1999) compared MNEs to DO 
firms in five Asian countries, and found the same conclusion. Boardman et al (1997) 
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explore an additional explanation for the observed profitability differences that are the 
agency costs. Using a data set of Canadian companies they found that when control 
agency costs FO firms are significantly more profitable than DO firms. 
Bellak (2004) argues that is one of the characteristics in which FO firms tend to perform 
worse than DO firms. In his own words this can be related to “the motivation of MNEs 
to minimize their tax burden may be responsible for an inferior profitability 
performance of affiliates” (p. 17). 
Using a data set of Canadian firms for the years 1992–1994 and 1997, Mathur et al 
(2001), found evidence that DO appear to be more profitable than FO firms. DO have 
showed “higher profitability for at least four of the six profitability measures for the 
first three years of data and for two measures for the last year”(p. 569-570).  
In a study developed by Luo and Tan (1998), that compares FO and DO firms in a 
emerging market, the authors concluded that DO firms are more profitable than FO. 
Gomes and Ramaswamy (1999) studied the relationship between multinationality and 
performance, using profitability measures. The conclusion is that increase the 
multionationality degree brings significant performance benefits but only till a certain 
point. This means that are a optimum level of multionationality and a U inverted 
relationship between multinationality and performance. 
 
Table 2. Profitability Literature Review: A Synthesis 
Author Period 
Country 
Focus 
Research Focus 
concerning FO vs DO 
firms 
Methodology 
FO vs DO 
firms 
Kimura and 
Kiyota, 
2007  
22500 Firms  
(1994-2000) 
Japan FO vs DO Firms: 
Economic Performance in 
Japan 
random-effects 
model; Probit model 
FO(+) 
Girma et al, 
2004 
1200 Firms 
(2000) 
Ireland Exports, international 
investment, and plant 
performance: Evidence 
from a non-parametric 
test 
First order stochastic 
dominance; K-S test 
FO(+) 
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Qian et al, 
2003  
271 Firms  
(1998) 
USA Does multinationality 
affect profit performance? 
an empirical study of U.S. 
SMEs 
Regression model FO(+) 
Pfaffermayr 
and Bellak, 
2000 
536 Firms  
(1996-1999) 
Austria Why FO firms are 
different : a conceptual 
framework and empirical 
evidence for Austria 
Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
OLS 
FO (+) 
Ramstetter, 
1999 
 1970-1996 Asia Comparisons of FO and 
DO in Asian 
manufacturing over time 
Means Comparison FO (+) 
Boardman 
et al, 1997 
350 Corp.  
(1986-1991) 
Canada The role of agency costs 
in explaining the superior 
performance of foreign 
MNCs 
OLS FO(+) 
Gelübcke, 
2013a 
33922 - 
41292 
Observations  
(2007-2008) 
Germany FO and firm performance 
in German services. 
OLS ; t-test; K-S- 
test 
DO (+) 
Mathur et 
al, 2001  
400 Firms  
(1992–1994 
and 1997) 
Canada The evidence from 
Canadian firms on 
multinational 
diversification and 
performance 
descriptive and 
parametric test; 
multiple linear 
regression models; 
nonlinear 
regressions; Panel 
data 
DO (+) 
Luo and 
Tan, 1998  
51 Firms  
(1994) 
China A comparison of FO and 
DO firms in an emerging 
market: a strategic choice 
perspective 
Survey; Gentleman-
Givens 
transformation 
method 
DO (+) 
Kim and 
Lyn,1990 
100 Fims  
(1980-1984) 
USA FDI Theories and the 
Performance of Foreign 
Multinationals Operating 
in the US 
univariate analysis DO (+) 
Gelübcke, 
2013 
304471 
Observations  
(2007-2008) 
Germany The performance of 
foreign affiliates in 
German manufacturing: 
evidence from a new 
database  
Cross -section; t-test; 
Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test 
NSD 
Barbosa and 
Louri, 2005 
523 Firms PT 
- 2651 Firms 
GR  
(1992 PT - 
1997 GR) 
Portugal 
Greece 
Corporate Performance: 
Does Ownership Matter? 
A Comparison of FO and 
DO Firms in Greece and 
Portugal 
OLS; t-test NSD in 
Portugal 
case. In 
Greece, FO 
(+) 
Gomes and 
Ramaswam
y, 1999  
 95 Firms 
(1990-1993) 
USA The form of the 
relationship between 
multinationality and 
performance 
crosssection/timeseri
es regression method 
; autoregressive-
heteroskedastic 
model 
Curvilinear 
relationship 
between 
multination
ality and 
performanc
e. 
Source: Own Elaboration based on literature review 
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As we can see above, it is possible to find different conclusions when the subject is 
profitability. On balance, it appears more often that FO>DO. It will be hypothesized 
that FO firms are the group that is more profitable followed by DOM firms and at last 
by DO firms. 
H2.1: FO firms are more profitable than DOMs and DO firms 
H2.1: DOMs are more profitable than DO firms. 
1.4.3 - Innovation  
In terms of Innovation, Dachs and Ebersberger (2009), found that, in the Austrian case, 
the impact of foreign ownership on innovation is not significant. However, being a part 
of a multinational group is very important in the innovation process. The same authors 
have found, when they included more countries in the analysis (Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden) a“little indication that foreign-owned companies in small 
open economies are less innovative than their domestically owned counterparts” (Dachs 
and Ebersberger, 2009, p.403).  
Gelübcke (2013b) argued that FO firms spend more money in R&D activities than DO 
German firms, and Dachs et al (2008) found little indication that FO firms are less 
innovative than DO firms. Griffith et al (2004), examining the role of multinationals in 
service sectors and the importance of R&D activity conducted by foreign MNEs in the 
UK, found that multinationals conduct a substantial amount of UK R&D. However 
comparing British owned MNEs to foreign MNEs, the study concluded that R&D 
intensity depends of the sector in analysis. 
Falk, (2008) investigated the relationship between foreign ownership and innovation 
activities covering twelve European countries. He concluded that foreign owned firms 
are more likely to innovate than domestic firms, mainly in the New EU Member States, 
and that the differences in innovation are due to different firm characteristics, such as 
size, sector affiliation and exporting. 
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Based on the UK Community Innovation Survey 2007, Cook, et al (2013), concluded 
that subsidiaries of MNEs are more likely to produce innovations and to realise higher 
benefits from higher R&D intensity. 
Sadowski and Sadowski-Rasters, (2006) show that, in the Dutch case, foreignness is an 
important factor to explain inter-firm differences related to innovation. They concluded 
that “foreign subsidiaries are more innovative, they are more likely to introduce 
‘imitative’ as well as ‘real’ innovations compared to domestic firms” (p.447).  
Bae and Noh (2001) have concluded that multinationals corporations invest more in 
R&D than domestic corporations. They argued that R&D investment has a positive 
effect on the market value of the both being more pronounced in the multinationals 
corporations. 
Table 3. Innovation Literature Review: A Synthesis 
Author Period 
Country 
Focus 
Research Focus 
concerning FO vs DO 
firms 
Methodology 
FO vs DO 
firms 
Gelübcke 
2013b 
304471 
Observations  
(2007-2008) 
Germany The performance of 
foreign affiliates in 
German manufacturing: 
evidence from a new 
database  
Cross -
section; t-test; 
Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test 
FO (+) 
Falk, 2008 28000 
Observations  
(1998-2000) 
Europe Effects of foreign 
ownership on innovation 
activities: Empirical 
evidence for twelve 
European countries 
Oaxaca-
Blinder-type 
decompositio
n for binary 
probit models 
FO (+) 
Sadowski 
and 
Sadowski, 
2006 
4780 Firms  
(1996) 
Netherlands On the innovativeness of 
foreign affiliates: 
Evidence from companies 
in The Netherlands 
logit 
estimation 
FO (+) 
Griffith et 
al, 2004 
1662824 
Establishments  
(1999-2001) 
UK FO and productivity: New 
evidence from the service 
sector and the R&D lab 
Index 
Comparison 
FO (+) 
Iyer, 2009 112 Firms  
(1989-2004) 
India Indian multinationals, 
foreign multinationals and 
domestic firms 
Levinson–
Petrin method 
DOM>FO>DO 
Dachs  et al, 
2008 
5773 Firms  
(1998-2000) 
Austria  
Denmark  
Finland  
Norway  
Sweden 
The innovative 
performance of foreign-
owned enterprises in 
small open economies 
 multivariate 
analysis 
DO (+) 
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Kim and 
Lyn 1990 
100 Fims  
(1980-1984) 
USA FDI Theories and 
the Performance of 
Foreign 
Multinationals 
Operating in the 
US 
univariate analysis DO (+) 
Dachs et al, 
2009 
1294 
Enterprises  
(1998-2000) 
Austria   Does foreign 
ownership matter 
for the innovative 
activities of 
enterprises? 
Based on the 
techniques to 
estimate treatment 
effects; Matching 
approach ; Heckman 
regression model 
NSD 
Cook et al, 
2013 
11775 
Observations  
(2007) 
UK Clustering, MNEs, 
and Innovation: 
Who Benefits and 
How? 
Probit model; 
ordered probit; 
Heckman two-step 
model 
DOM show 
higher levels of 
innovation 
effort.  
Source: Own Elaboration based on literature review 
 
Unfortunately, the data set available for the empirical analysis does not allow us to 
analyze what kind of companies is more innovative in the Portuguese market. 
Nevertheless, we decided to report this literature review on this relevant topic, as it was 
purposefully developed for this dissertation, and may be tested in future applications.  
1.4.4 - Investment 
In terms of Investment, Griffith et al (2004), in a paper that examines the relationship 
between foreign ownership and productivity in service sector, found that FO MNEs 
have higher levels of investment than British owned MNEs. Griffith and Simpson 
(2003), found that FO firms invest more than British owned MNEs. 
Bae & Noh (2001) analysed the differences in R&D investment activities between MNE 
corporations and domestic corporations and found that MNE corporations invest more 
in R&D than the domestic counterpart. 
Pfaffermayr and Bellak (2000) argue that the gaps in investment propensity are 
essentially related to firm characteristics and not to foreign ownership. 
Ylä-Anttila et al (2004) concluded that FO companies have invested less than Finnish 
owned companies and that the return on capital invested is higher in FO than in DO 
firms. 
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In a different perspective, Yoshikawa, et al (2005) analyzed the effect of ownership on 
human capital investment, to Japanese manufacturing firms, and concluded that 
domestic ownership has a positive effect on human capital investment while foreign 
ownership has an opposite effect.  
Table 4. Investment Literature Review: A Synthesis 
Author Period Country 
Focus 
Research Focus 
concerning FO vs DO 
firms 
Methodology FO vs DO 
firms 
Griffith et 
al, 2004 
1662824 
Establishments  
(1999-2001) 
GB FOand productivity: New 
evidence from the service 
sector and the R&D lab 
Index 
Comparison 
FO (+) 
Griffith and 
Simpson, 
2003 
12900-10457 
Establishments  
(1980-1996) 
UK Characteristics of FO 
firms in British 
manufacturing 
OLS; F-test FO (+) 
Bae and 
Noh, 2001 
563 Firms  
(1991-1995) 
USA MNE corporations versus 
DO corporations: A 
comparative study of 
R&D investment 
activities 
cross-sectional 
regression 
analysis 
FO (+) 
Yla-Anttila 
et al, 2004 
500 Firms  
(1986-1998) 
Finland FO in Finland: Boosting 
firm performance and 
changing corporate 
governance 
Linear 
Regression; t- 
test 
DO (+) 
Yoshikawa 
et al, 2005 
996 Firms  
(1998-2002) 
Japan The impact of ownership 
structure on wage 
intensity in Japanese 
corporations 
autoregressive-
distributed lag 
models ; GMM 
DO has a 
positive effect 
on human 
capital 
investment, 
FO has the 
opposite 
effect 
Pfaffermayr 
and Bellak, 
2000 
536 Firms  
(1996-1999) 
Austria Why FO firms are 
different : a conceptual 
framework and empirical 
evidence for Austria 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Test, OLS 
Gaps 
primarily 
explained by 
firm 
characteristics 
rather than 
foreign 
ownership 
Source: Own elaboration based on literature review 
This characteristics is another that it can`t be developed in the empirical part. 
Nevertheless, we decided to report this literature review on this relevant topic, as it was 
purposefully developed for this dissertation, and may be tested in future applications. 
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1.4.5 - Exports  
There are two points of view about the effects of FDI in the exports of the host country. 
On one hand, FDI promotes exports by increasing domestic capital availability for 
exports, transfer of technology and new products for exports, access to new and large 
foreign markets, upgrade of local workforce, technical and management skills. On the 
other hand, it is sometimes suggested that FDI may have a negative impact on the 
exports of home country by replacing domestic savings and investment; transfer 
technologies that are low level or inappropriate for the host country’s factor 
proportions; target mainly the host country’s domestic market; inhibit the expansion of 
indigenous firms that might become exporters (Zhang, 2005). 
Even when the theme is exports, we can find different results. While Willmore (1986), 
Dachs and Ebersberger (2009), Rasiah, and Gachino (2005) found that FO firms export 
more than DO firms, Iyer (2009) concluded that Indian (DO) MNEs export more than 
foreign MNEs. Gelübcke (2013b), that studied the performance of FO affiliates in 
German manufacturing, have found that FO affiliates export more even when compared 
with DO MNEs. 
In a research on the Greek food sector, Anastassopoulos (2003), developed a 
probabilistic regression model that allowed to conclude that is more likely to observe 
higher export performance in MNE subsidiaries than in their domestic counterparts. 
Greenaway et al, (2004) concluded in their research about spillovers on the UK market, 
that there is evidence that foreign MNEs influence the decision of domestic firms to 
export, as well as their export propensity. 
There are studies relating the importance of going abroad to the productivity firms` 
(Murakami, 2005; Kimura and Kiyota, 2006). We can find results suggesting that 
exports have an important role of on firms` productivity. Murakami (2005) observed 
that purely domestic firms (that do not serve at all foreign markets) are less productive 
than firms that serve foreign markets, and from those who serve foreign markets, those 
that only export have higher productivity than those who engage in FDI. 
Recently, Du et al (2012) analyzed how foreign affiliates and domestic Chinese firms 
differ in learning by exporting. The results of the study show that domestic firms learnt 
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by exporting and foreign affiliates did not. This can be explained by the fact that 
domestic export starters after getting in contact with foreign firms acquire know how 
and learn the international best practices that enable them to improve their productivity. 
Table 5. Exports Literature Review: A Synthesis 
Author Period Country 
Focus 
Research Focus 
concerning FO vs 
DO firms 
Methodology FO vs DO firms 
Gelübcke, 
2013b 
304471 
Observations  
(2007-2008) 
Germany The performance of  
FO in German 
manufacturing: 
evidence from a new 
database  
Cross -section; t-
test; 
Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test 
FO (+) 
Dachs et al, 
2009 
1294 
Enterprises  
(1998-2000) 
Austria   Does FO matter for 
the innovative 
activities of 
enterprises? 
methodology is 
based on the 
techniques to 
estimate 
treatment effects; 
Matching 
approach ; 
Heckman 
regression model 
FO (+) 
Willmore, 
1986 
282 Firms  
(1978-1983) 
Brazil The Comparative 
Performance of FO 
and DO in Brazil 
Matched Pairs FO (+) 
Greenaway et 
al, 2004 
3662  
(1992-1996) 
UK Do domestic firms 
learn to export from 
multinationals? 
Heckman 
selection model 
Exporting firms 
more productive  
Iyer, 2009 112 Firms  
(1989-2004) 
India Indian multinationals, 
foreign multinationals 
and domestic firms 
Levinson–Petrin 
method 
DOM>FO>DO 
Du et al, 2012 438457 Firms  
(1998-2005) 
China Do DO and foreign 
exporters differ in 
learning by exporting? 
Evidence from China 
Olley–Pakes 
method ; 
propensity score 
matching method 
DO learnt by 
exporting and 
foreign affiliates 
did not. 
Murakami, 
2005 
68369 
Observations 
(1994-1998)  
Japan Are multinational 
enterprises more 
productive? A test of 
the selection 
hypothesis 
Mean and STD 
comparison 
Productivity of 
MNE differs 
significantly 
from that of DO.  
Kimura and 
Kiyota, 2006 
22000 Firms  
(1994-2000) 
Japan Exports, FDI, and 
productivity: Dynamic 
evidence from 
Japanese firms 
multilateral index 
; probit model 
Most productive 
firms engage in 
exports and FDI 
Anastassopoul
os, 2003 
75 Firms  
(1988-1992) 
Greece MNE subsidiaries 
versus DO enterprises: 
An analysis of their 
ownership and 
location-specific 
advantages 
probabilistic 
regression model 
; pre-regression 
tests 
It is more likely 
to observe higher 
export 
performance in 
MNE. 
Source: Own elaboration based on literature review 
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The data set allow us to identify if a company is exporter or not. So having in mind the 
literature review and following the results of Iyer (2009) it will be hypothesized that it is 
more likely an exporter company to be DOM than otherwise.  
H3.1: It is more likely to find an Exporter company among FO than DOM and 
DO. 
H3.2: It is more likely to find an Exporter company among DOM than DO 
1.4.6 - Capital Intensity  
Iyer (2009) found, that Indian MNEs are more capital intensive than Foreign MNEs 
(consistent with Doms and Jensen, 1998). On the other hand, Pfaffermayr and Bellak 
(2000), Koirala and Koshal (2000) and Willmore (1986) concluded that FO firms show 
higher capital intensity than DO firms. 
Dimelis and Louri (2002) found that, for the case of Greece, ownership is directly 
related to capital intensity. FO firms are more capital intensive than DO and as higher is 
the foreign owned part, in a company, the higher is the capital intensity. 
Howenstine and Zeile (1994) argued that in the USA the higher capital intensity of FO 
establishments can be explained by the great concentration of FO establishments in 
industries that are most capital intensive. 
There is literature correlating capital intensity and firm exports (Siddharthan, and 
Nollen, 2004). This research results show that capital intensity is not a preponderant 
determinant in MNEs affiliates, but it is important in the case of domestic firms. 
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Table 6.  Capital Intensity Literature Review: A Synthesis 
Author Period Country 
Focus 
Research Focus concerning 
FO vs DO firms 
Methodology FO vs DO 
firms 
Pfaffermayr 
and 
Bellak,2000 
536 Firms  
(1996-1999) 
Austria Why FO firms are different : 
a conceptual framework and 
empirical evidence for 
Austria 
Kruskal-
Wallis Test, 
OLS 
FO (+) 
Koirala and 
Koshal, 
2000 
1021 Firms 
(1992) 
Nepal Productivity and technology 
in Nepal: An analysis of FO 
and DO firms 
OLS; TSLS FO (+) 
Ramstetter, 
1999 
 1970-1996 Asia Comparisons of FO and DO 
in asian manufacturing over 
time 
Means 
Comparison 
FO (+) 
Doms and 
Jensen, 
1998 
115000 
Observations  
(1987-1988) 
USA Comparing Wages, Skills, 
and Productivity between DO 
and FO Manufacturing 
Establishments in the United 
States 
Compare 
averages; 
Regression 
Linear Model 
FO (+) 
Howenstine 
and Zeile, 
1994 
11934 
Establishments  
(1989-1990) 
USA Characteristics of Foreign-
Owned U.S. Manufacturing 
Establishments 
Simple 
comparison 
FO (+) 
Blomstrom, 
1988 
215 Firms 
(1970) 
Mexico Labor productivity 
differences between FO and 
DO firms in Mexico 
OLS FO (+) 
Willmore, 
1986 
282 Firms  
(1978-1983) 
Brazil The Comparative 
Performance of FO and DO 
Firms in Brazil 
Matched Pairs FO (+) 
Iyer, 2009 112 Firms  
(1989-2004) 
India Indian multinationals, foreign 
multinationals and domestic 
firms 
Levinson–
Petrin method 
DO (+) 
Source: Own elaboration based on literature review 
 
The data available for the aims of this study does not allow us to compare this 
characteristic through the different set of companies. However, we decided to report this 
literature review on this relevant topic, as it was purposefully developed for this 
dissertation, and may be tested in future applications. 
1.4.7 - Technological intensity 
Relevant literature has shown that being part of a MNE network is more important than 
foreign ownership per se. FO firms tend to be more technology intensive than DO 
firms. However, when FO firms are compared with DO MNEs, the latter tend be more 
technology intensive than the first (Iyer, 2009; Doms and Jensen, 1998; Dobbelaere, 
2004). This reflects the importance of firm specific advantages, showing that firms 
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which are part of a MNE network have comparative advantage over their domestic 
counterparts which are not part of an MNE (Gelübcke, 2013b). 
Yeaple (2005), argued that this trend can be verified even in the first step of 
internationalization, e.g. exports. In his model, he has compared firms that export and 
those who do not. He concluded that the former employ more advanced technologies 
than the latter. 
Table 7. Technological Intensity Literature Review: A Synthesis 
Author Year Period Country 
Focus 
Research Focus concerning FO 
vs DO firms 
FO vs DO firms 
Iyer, 2009 2009 112 Firms  
(1989-2004) 
India Indian multinationals, foreign 
multinationals and domestic firms 
Indian MNCs 
have better 
technological 
characteristics  
Doms and 
Jensen, 
1998 
1998 115000 
Observations  
(1987-1988) 
USA Comparing Wages, Skills, and 
Productivity between DO and FO 
Manufacturing Establishments in 
the United States 
FO (+) 
Yeaple, 
2005 
2005 Model Model A simple model of firm 
heterogeneity, international trade, 
and wages 
Exporting firms 
employ more 
advanced 
technologies than 
non exporting 
firms 
Source: Own elaboration based on literature review 
 
This is another characteristic about it is not possible identify empirical results. Once 
again, we decided to report this literature review on this relevant topic, as it was 
purposefully developed for this dissertation, and may be tested in future applications. 
1.4.8 - Size 
Another important firm characteristic is size. It tends to be assumed that differences in 
size are an important source of differences in productivity (De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 
2001).  
In this point the literature seems to be very convergent showing that FO firms on 
average are larger than DO firms (Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 2000; De Backer and 
Sleuwaegen, 2005; Gelübcke, 2013b; Griffith and Simpson, 2003). This fact it is related 
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to the capability of FO firms better exploit economies of scale, what shows that the 
superior performance of FO can be attributed to the larger scale of operations (De 
Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2001). 
Using a database of Japanese companies in USA Blonigen and Tomlin, (2001) not only 
concluded that Japanese plants are larger and grow faster, but also they have established 
a relationship between size and growth for FO firms. They have concluded that smaller 
plants grow faster.  
There are some researches on the size-wage effect and ownership (Brown and Medoff, 
1989; Dobbelaere, 2004) that found evidence of a positive firm size-wage effect. 
Having in mind this finding and the literature convergence, that FO firms are larger than 
DO firms, we can expect that FO firms pay higher wages than DO firms. 
However it can be find researches with non conclusive results as it is the case of the 
study developed by Mathur et al (2001) in the Canadian market. 
 
Table 8. Size Literature Review: A Synthesis 
Author Period Country 
Focus 
Research Focus 
concerning FO vs DO 
firms 
Methodology FO vs 
DO 
firms 
Gelübcke, 2013 304471 
Observations  
(2007-2008) 
Germany The performance of FO 
in German 
manufacturing: evidence 
from a new database  
Cross -section; 
t-test; 
Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test 
FO (+) 
Wang and Mathur, 
2011 
2184 Firm-year 
Observations  
(1993-2004) 
USA Return on capital 
analysis: U.S.-based 
multinational 
corporations versus U.S. 
domestic corporations 
Univariate 
analysis; 
multivariate 
analysis. 
FO (+) 
Dachs et al, 2009 1294 
Enterprises  
(1998-2000) 
Austria   Does foreign ownership 
matter for the innovative 
activities of enterprises? 
Matching 
approach ; 
Heckman 
regression 
model 
FO (+) 
Backer and 
Sleuwaegen,  2005 
22452 Firms  
(1990-1995) 
Belgium A closer look at the 
productivity advantage 
of foreign affiliates 
stochastic 
frontier 
methodology ; 
OLS 
FO (+) 
Dobbelaere, 2004 1514 Firms  
(1997-1998) 
Bulgaria  Ownership, firm size 
and rent sharing in 
Bulgaria 
Cross-sectional 
time-series 
estimates; OLS; 
Panel data 
FO (+) 
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Griffith and 
Simpson, 2003 
12900-10457 
Establishments  
(1980-1996) 
UK Characteristics of FO 
firms in British 
manufacturing 
OLS; F-test FO (+) 
Pfaffermayr and 
Bellak, 2000 
536 Firms  
(1996-1999) 
Austria Why FO firms are 
different : a conceptual 
framework and 
empirical evidence for 
Austria 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Test, OLS 
FO (+) 
Howenstine and 
Zeile, 1994 
11934 
Establishments  
(1989-1990) 
USA Characteristics of FO 
U.S. Manufacturing 
Establishments 
Simple 
comparison 
FO (+) 
Globerman et al, I 
1994 
5553 Firms  
N.A 
Canada The economic 
performance of foreign 
affiliates in Canada. 
OLS; White - 
test; t- test 
FO (+) 
SR Yeaple 2005 Model  Model A simple model of firm 
heterogeneity, 
international trade, and 
wages 
Model Export 
firms are 
larger than 
non export 
Mathur et al, 2001 400 Firms  
(1992–1994 
and 1997) 
Canada The evidence from 
Canadian firms on 
multinational 
diversification and 
performance 
multiple linear 
regression 
models; 
nonlinear 
regressions; 
Panel data 
NSD 
Source: Own Elaboration based on literature review 
 
The literature tends to assume that FO firms are larger than DO firms. Following this 
general conclusion, in this study we posit the following hypothesis. 
H4.1: FO firms are larger than DOMs and DO firms 
H4.2: DOM larger than DO firms 
1.4.9 - Wages 
In fact, there is a significant convergence in the literature about wages. FO firms tend to 
pay higher wages than DO firms (Doms and Jensen 1998; Griffith and Simpson, 2003; 
Gelübcke, 2013a; Willmore, 1986). “Above-average wages can be used by human 
resource management as an incentive to prevent shirking and other absences, since the 
resulting costs are higher for MNEs which are more capital intensive” (Globerman et 
al. 1994: 152f., cited in Gelübcke, 2013b). Higher wages can be used to overcome 
disadvantages related to long-distance monitoring (Bellak, 2004) or they can be used as 
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an attempt to compensate the lack of information that companies face in foreign labor 
markets (Feliciano and Lipsey 2006, cited in Gelübcke, 2013b). Görg et al (2007) 
argued that one explanation to higher wages in FO firms may be the provision of on-
the-job training. While starting wages can be higher or lower, the wage growth is higher 
in FO firms. This can be related to on-job-training that is higher in FO firms than in 
their DO counterparts. 
The results found by Girma et al (2002) are consistent with the previous ones, but they 
go even further arguing that once a domestic company is acquired by a foreign firm the 
wages increase; in the opposite situation, a decrease in wages tends to occur. 
In the Portuguese case, Martins (2004) found that FO firms pay more inconditional 
terms, however, concluded that there are not “evidence of a positive relationship 
between the degree of foreign control and the wage premium of the firm” (p. 22-23). 
Consistent with the results reported, Feenstra and Hanson, (1997) conclued that the 
“growth in FDI is positively correlated with the relative demand for skilled labor” (p. 
371) which means higher wages. This is corroborated for the more recent study to 
German market (Jungnickel and Keller, 2003) that shows the demand for qualified 
labour is higher in FO firms when compared to DO firms. Another explanation is that 
FO firms hire workers more productive and pay them higher wages (Griffith, 1999 cited 
in te Velde, 2002). 
Jungnickel and Keller (2003) concluded that there is a positive relation between wages 
and size, i.e., wages increase with size. However, and surprising, this relation is 
stronger, in the German case, for DO firms that are oriented to the national market. 
Not only demand for skilled jobs and wages is higher in FO firms but also the wage 
elasticity of labour demand is higher. Godart et al (2012a): p.611 concluded that “the 
wage elasticity of labour demand is about 40 % lower in domestic than in foreign 
multinationals”. Hakkala et al (2010) argue that, in the Swedish case, there are no 
differences between FO and DO firms wage elasticity, but differences can be found 
between MNEs and Non-MNEs. MNEs have more wage elasticity than Non-MNEs, 
what can be explained by the flexible international network of MNEs. 
As can be seen, the literature on differences between FO and DO firms wages` has been 
the theme of several studies in recent years, and it can been found researches that had 
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quantified the wages differences as is the case of te Velde (2002) who argues that 
foreign establishment in Britain pay 13% more than domestic establishments. Kimura 
and Kiyota (2007) did not quantify the effects but concluded that wages have a faster 
growth in FO firms than in DO firms. 
Notwithstanding the literature convergence, Heyman, et al (2007), paid attention the 
aggregation level of the researches. The author used a detailed matched employer-
employee data and found that the wage premium in foreign owned firms is not so high 
as those found in studies with more aggregated level. 
 
Table 9. Wages Literature Review: A Synthesis 
Author Period Country 
Focus 
Research Focus 
concerning FO vs DO 
firms 
Methodology FO vs DO 
firms 
Gelübcke, 2013 304471 
Observations  
(2007-2008) 
Germany The performance of 
foreign affiliates in 
German 
manufacturing: 
evidence from a new 
database  
Cross -section; 
t-test; 
Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test 
FO (+) 
Dobbelaere, 
2004 
1514 Firms  
(1997-1998) 
Bulgaria  Ownership, firm size 
and rent sharing in 
Bulgaria 
Cross-sectional 
time-series 
estimates; 
OLS; Panel 
data 
FO (+) 
Griffith and 
Simpson, 2003 
12900-10457 
Establishments  
(1980-1996) 
UK Characteristics of FO 
firms in British 
manufacturing 
OLS; F-test FO (+) 
Lipsey and 
Sjoholm, 2003 
 1975-1999 Indonesia FO and Indonesian 
manufacturing wages: 
an analysis with panel 
data 
  FO (+) 
Girma et al, 
2002 
460 firms 
1989-1994 
UK Why are Productivity 
and Wages Higher in 
FO Firms 
Panel 
regression ; t- 
test 
FO (+) 
Te Velde, 2002 846 
Establishments  
(1990-1998) 
UK FO and wages in 
British establishments 
sample weights 
in estimation 
FO (+) 
Doms and 
Jensen, 1998 
115000 
Observations  
(1987-1988) 
USA Comparing Wages, 
Skills, and Productivity 
between DO and FO 
Manufacturing 
Establishments in the 
United States 
Compare 
averages; 
Regression 
Linear Model 
FO (+) 
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Howenstine and 
Zeile, 1994 
11934 
Establishments  
(1989-1990) 
USA Characteristics of FO 
U.S. Manufacturing 
Establishments 
Simple 
comparison 
FO (+) 
Globerman et 
al, I 1994 
5553 Firms 
N.A 
Canada The economic 
performance of foreign 
affiliates in Canada. 
OLS; White 
- test; t- test 
FO (+) 
Willmore, 1986 282 Firms  
(1978-1983) 
Brazil The Comparative 
Performance of FO and 
DO Firms in Brazil 
Matched 
Pairs 
FO (+) 
SR Yeaple 
2005 
Model Model A simple model of 
firm heterogeneity, 
international trade, and 
wages 
Model Exporting 
firms pay 
higher wages 
than non 
export 
Godart et al, 
2012a) 
1081 Firms  
(1996-2005) 
Ireland Domestic 
multinationals, foreign 
affiliates, and labour 
demand elasticities 
OLS ; 
GMM 
The wage 
elasticity of 
labour demand 
is lower in 
DOM than FO. 
Hakkala et al, 
2010 
10264 
Observations  
(1990-2002) 
Sweden Multinationals, skills, 
and wage elasticities 
GMM The wage 
elasticity is 
higher in MNE 
than in DO 
firms 
Jungnickel and 
Keller, 2003 
 2001 Germany Foreign-owned Firms 
in the German Labour 
Market 
  The demand 
for qualified 
labour is 
higher in FO 
than  DO. 
Source: Own elaboration based on literature review 
 
The literature present us an important set of conclusions that support the hypothesis that 
FO firms pay higher wages than the other two groups of companies under analyzes in 
this study. This trend allows us to follow that: 
H5.1: FO firms pay higher wages than PTC 
H5.2: FO pay higher wages than DOM and DO 
H5.3: DOM pay higher than DO firms. 
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1.4.10 - Efficiency 
Once FO firms know they need to compensate for their liability of foreignness, they 
need to be more efficient than DO firms (De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2001), confirming 
classic theory about competition in a foreign environment. However it is possible to 
find results contrasting with classic theory. Kim and Lyn (1990) concluded that US-
owned firms tend to be, on average, more efficient than their FO counterparts, and 
Koirala and Koshal (2000) found that foreign firms, in Nepal, are not more efficient that 
domestic companies. Wang and Mathur (2011) argue that DO firms manage their assets 
more efficiently than FO firms. 
Blomstrom (1986) argued that the presence of FO firms, in Mexican case, is positively 
correlated with structural efficiency of the industry. This suggests that FO firms are 
more efficient than DO firms. 
Girma and Wright (2002), found that differences in efficiency are essentially related to 
the use of capital. FO firms tend to be more efficient in the use of them capital than their 
domestic counterparts. 
 
Table 10. Efficiency Literature Review 
Author Period Country 
Focus 
Research Focus 
concerning FO vs 
DO firms 
Methodology FO vs DO firms 
de Backer and 
Sleuwaegen,  2005 
22452 Firms  
(1990-1995) 
Belgium A closer look at the 
productivity 
advantage of foreign 
affiliates 
stochastic 
frontier 
methodology ; 
OLS 
FO (+) 
Koirala and 
Koshal, 2000 
1021 Firms 
(1992) 
Nepal Productivity and 
technology in Nepal: 
An analysis of 
foreign and domestic 
firms 
OLS; TSLS DO (+) 
Kim and Lyn, 1990 100 Fims  
N.A 
USA FDI Theories and the 
Performance of 
Foreign 
Multinationals 
Operating in the US 
univariate 
analysis 
DO (+) 
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de Backer and 
Sleuwaegen,  2001 
25190 
Observations  
(1990-1995) 
Belgium Why are FO firms 
more productive than 
domestic firms? 
Panel data; 
Stochastic 
frontier 
approach 
FO firms are 
highly efficient 
since they know 
they have to 
compensate for 
their liability of 
foreigness. 
Blomström, 1986 215 Firms 
(1970-1975) 
Mexico Foreign Investment 
and Productive 
Efficiency: The Case 
of Mexico 
OLS Foreign 
presence in an 
industry is 
positively 
correlated with 
structural 
efficiency 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Having in mind the theoretical background of liability of foreignness and the need of 
foreign companies to be more efficient in order to overcome the difficulties of doing 
business in a foreign market, we could assume that FO are more efficient than DO and 
DOM, however this characteristic it will not be analyzed in present study. We decided 
to report this literature review on this relevant topic, as it was purposefully developed 
for this dissertation, and may be tested in future applications. 
 
There is a considerable number of studies covering literature about differences between 
foreign owned companies and their domestic counterpart. Many of them were analyzed 
in this literature review, but as can be seen the trend of studies focus tend to be on 
differences of performance. The present dissertation aims to going even further 
presenting results about other characteristics and distinguish domestic companies in two 
different groups (DO and DOM). 
Having in mind that different conclusions, in the literature, can be related to the use of 
different methodologies, samples, and host countries, this study intends to provide 
significant conclusions about the differences in characteristics between Portuguese 
companies (DO and DOM) and FO firms, following the hypothesis summarized above. 
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Chapter 2 – Empirical Investigation 
This chapter will describe the methodology used, the estimation procedures of the 
econometric model and the analysis of the results contrasting them with the relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature. 
2.1 - Data Source 
To achieve the aims of this study, data were extracted from the SABI database, notably 
from the last version (updated on January 6
th
). This database provides information of 
almost 500.000 companies in Portugal, which constitutes a rich and relevant data set for 
research and analysis. The database allows the use of search criteria to extract the data 
on specific characteristics under analysis in this study. 
Bureau Van Dijk`s SABI database provides information about companies located in 
Portugal. We used the period between 2008 and 2012 because it suits better the 
purposes of this study. An important feature of the data set is that it enables the 
identification of foreign owned firms as well as domestic MNEs, and which is very 
important to the aims of this study.  
Before undertaking the extraction, we selected two important criteria, in order to narrow 
down the sample and use the data that were more relevant for the aims of the study. We 
decided to eliminate micro enterprises form the sample, as their inclusion would mean 
that most companies were single-owner companies, or even single-employee 
companies, which would distort our results. For that, we used the European Union 
criterion (less than 10 employees) to define a micro enterprise (European Commission, 
2005). This criteria was followed to guarantee that no one of the groups will be biased 
because of the size of the companies 
As referred before in this study a foreign firm is defined as one in which at least 10 per 
cent of equity is owned by a foreign business entity. This threshold is suggested and 
used for statistical purposes by the UNCTAD (2007) and OECD (2008) as well as in the 
literature (e.g. Gelübcke, 2013b; Griffith et al. 2004; Doms and Jensen 1998). For the 
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aims of this study this will be the second criterion used and all firms not meeting this 
criterion are defined as Domestic owned.  
These two criteria conjugated allowed us to extract 3 different groups of data, one per 
type of company of interest to the present study. One to analyze the FO firms another to 
the DO with FDI (DOM) and last by one related to DO firms without FDI. With these 
mutual exclusive groups of data it will be possible to compare the characteristics of the 
3 groups.  
The data was extracted by year (each year at once) and then preceded to the elimination 
of those companies that have changed their status in terms of ownership in order to have 
three different and independent data sets. 
Using the criteria referred to above, i.e., more than 10 employees and at least 10% of 
foreign capital ownership, it was possible to identify a total of 1213 FO companies in 
Portugal.  
The second group are the DOM. To extract this group the same criterion for size was 
used, as well as the OECD Benchmark Definition (OECD, 2008) but in this case to 
identify the Portuguese companies that have subsidiaries abroad and hold at least 10% 
of the equity of those subsidiaries. This group is composed by a total of 363 companies.  
The third group represents the DO firms without FDI, i.e. Portuguese firms without 
subsidiaries abroad. As in the other groups we used the European Union criterion of 
micro companies (European Commission, 2005) and the additional criterion that 
enables us to extract the companies in Portugal whose capital ownership is at least 90% 
Portuguese capital (OECD, 2008). Our final sample for this type of companies is 
composed by 19.359 firms. 
Table 11. Number of Companies and Observations  
 
Number of 
Companies 
Observations Manufacturing  
Companies 
Observations 
Manufacturing  
FO 1.213 6.065 6.114 1.765 
DOM 363 1.815 164 820 
DO 19.359 96.795 353 30.570 
Note: FO represents Foreign Owned companies; DOM stands for Portuguese Companies with FDI 
and DO for Portuguese Companies without FDI.  
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2.2 - Variables and Proxies 
Before present the descriptive and econometric result it is important to specify the 
variables used to these estimations and results. 
2.2.1 - Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables, proxied by several measures related to the characteristics 
identified, allow to test for the existence of differences in characteristics between FO 
and DO firms, and whether those differences vary from characteristic to characteristic. 
The characteristics under analysis in the models that will be estimated are: Productivity, 
Profitability, Size, Exporter Status and Wages. Even if we have analyzed even more 
characteristics in the literature review, due the data set limitations the above mentioned 
variables are only those for what there are data available and, therefore, for which 
results can be presented. 
Productivity will be measured as the ratio of Gross Value Added per Employee (Davies 
and Lyons, 1991). To measure Profitability, different kinds of proxies/measures will be 
used in order to test if there are differences between FO and DO firms. In terms of 
profitability as used by Girma et al, (2004) profit per employee is going to be included 
in the analyses. 
To study and analyze the differences between FO and DO firms in terms of size, this 
latter variable is going to be measured by the number of employees (Dachs et al, 2009). 
Another important characteristic under analysis is wages. To measure the differences in 
term of wages, wages per employee will be used (Jungnickel and Keller, 2003). 
To identify if a company is an exporter or not, this study uses a dummy (1 if exporter; 0 
if not exporter). 
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Table 12. Dependent variables 
Dependent Variables Proxies 
Productivity log (GVA per Employee) 
Profitability log (Profit per employee) 
Size log (Number of Employees) 
Wages log (Wages per Employee) 
Exporter Export dummy; If companies export or not 
 
2.3.2 - Independent Variables 
The main variables of interest to the aims of this study are the dummies FO and DOM. 
If the share of foreign ownership on the focal firm’s equity is greater or equal to 10% 
FO assumes the value 1 and 0 otherwise. DOM assumes the value of 1 when it is a 
Portuguese company that owes at least 10% of a subsidiary abroad, otherwise it is 0.  
Other explanatory variable is the age of a firm. Firm`s age is represented by the number 
of years since the firm was founded and it is the one of the most used proxy in the key 
literature (see for instance Barbosa and Louri, 2005).Always that possible we are going 
to test the age square in order to test a U shaped relationship between age and all the 
characteristics.  
Firm size is a relevant measure that can affects characteristics and it will be measured 
by the number of total employees (Gelübcke, 2013b). Always that possible we are going 
to test the size square in order to test a U shaped relationship between size and all the 
characteristics. 
The data set enable the extraction of the NACE codification. This classification it will 
be used to split the data set into different kind of companies, according to sector. To the 
econometric estimations of what are the implications of each kind of companies on the 
differences in characteristics, we are going to test two kinds of companies using a 
dummy: 1 if it is a manufacturing company, and 0 if it is a non manufacturing company. 
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The choice of these independent variables took into account previous researches about 
this area.  
In order to not compare “apples with oranges” Doms and Jensen (1998), one of the first 
studies to distinguish between DO and DOM, have set the same independent variables 
as this study with the difference that they used a dummy to industry and in this study it 
is going to be used a dummy to manufacturing companies (Temouri et al, 2008).  
The literature tends to assume Size as an important source of differences between FO 
and DO firms (Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 2000). Studies as those conducted by 
Siddharthan and Nollen, 2004; Barbosa and Louri, 2005; Wang and Mathur, 2011 use 
Size as independent variable to their estimations.  
Following Gelübcke (2013b)’s findings, a positive impact of size on productivity, 
wages and export probability is expected. A negative impact is expected in profitability 
(Gelübcke, 2013a).  
Globerman et al,. 1994 used Age as one of the control variables to find differences in 
terms of productivity between FO and DO firms. Jovanovic (1982) and Pakes and 
Ericsson (1998) have predicted that young firms tend to be less productive than older 
firms. Age it will be used as one of independent variables in the estimations to reach our 
goal in terms of econometric approach. It is expected a positive relation between this 
variable and productivity (Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2005). In terms of profitability it is 
expected a positive relation between both variables (Qian et al, 2003). It is also 
expected a positive relation with Size, Wages and Exporter Probability. 
Another variable that can have impact on the characteristics differences between FO and 
DO firms is the sector of activity (Görg et al, 2007; Temouri et al, 2008), so it will be 
included to understand what impact the sector of activity can have in the Portuguese 
case on the characteristics under analyses. It will be used the European Union 
classification of activities known as NACE to identify if companies are manufacturing 
or non manufacturing. Having in mind the literature review and the specifications of 
each study that are related with a specific country or countries (and different 
codifications) we are not going to do predictions about this dummy. 
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Table 13. Independent Variables And Expected Signs 
Independent Variables Proxy/ Description 
Size log (Number of Employees) 
Age log (Age) 
Manufacturing Manufacturing vs non Manufacturing (dummy) 
FO Foreign Owned Company (Dummy) 
Age2 log (Number of Employees), squared 
Size2 log (Number of Employees), squared 
DOM Domestic Company with FDI (Dummy) 
Variable Characteristic Expected Sign 
FO 
Productivity + 
Profitability + 
Wages + 
Exports + 
Size + 
   
DOM 
Productivity + 
Profitability + 
Wages + 
Exports + 
Size + 
   
Size 
Productivity + and inverted U shaped 
Profitability - 
Wages + 
Exports + 
Size 
 
   
Age 
Productivity + and inverted U shaped  
Profitability + 
Wages + 
Exports + 
Size + 
Source: Own Elaboration 
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2.4 - Descriptive Statistics 
As to the empirical study itself, it will start with the descriptive analysis highlighting 
different characteristics of FO and Portuguese firms, splitting the domestic firms into 
the two kinds referred before (DOM and DO). After the extraction, we performed a 
detailed preliminary analysis of the data
1
. 
From the data below (table 14 till 17) we conclude that, despite the fact that DOMs have 
a higher dispersion around the mean, they are on average older than FO and DO 
companies. 
Analyzing the main variables that it will be used to the econometric study the first 
results prove interesting. 
The number of employees is used as measure company`s size and indicate that DOM 
are larger than the other group of companies. This can indicate that unlike we 
hypothesized and unlike the expectation of the literature (Gelübcke, 2013; Wang and 
Mathur, 2011; Dachs et al, 2009; Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2005), in the Portuguese 
case, DOMs tend to be larger than FO firms followed by DO firms.  
DOMs generate, on average, almost 3 times of the turnover generated by FO firms and 
the turnover of DO firms not even represents 5% of the average turnover generated by 
the DOM`s.  
In terms of Gross Added Value the DOMs appear once again as those with higher 
results on average. DOMs` Gross Added Value is almost 3 times of the FO firms and 
more than 21 times the Gross Added Value of DO firms.  
Using this variable and the number of employees we can calculate which group is on 
average more productive. In table 14 and 15, it is possible to see that, on average, 
DOMs are more productive than FO and DO firms what is not in line with part of 
literature (Gelübcke, 2013; Chang and Marrewijk, 2013; Adenaeuer  and Heckelei, 
2011; Temouri et al, 2008; Havrylchyk, 2006) but corroborates the results found by Iyer 
(2009) and Doms and Jensen (1998). However, when comparing only FO and DO firms 
                                                 
1
 The description of each variable are in the section appendix I. In all the analyses of this dissertation 
related to data set DO stands for just Portuguese Owned Companies without FDI. 
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the results are in line with literature referred above, i.e., FO firms are more productive 
than DO firms. 
In terms of profitability, if we analyze the profit generated per employee (profemp) we 
conclude that, on average, the DOMs` employees are almost 2 times more profitable 
that those who work on FO companies, while those who work on DO firms present a 
profit per employee of only 1,5%. This results show us that the Portuguese case is in 
line with the literature who mainly predict that FO firms are more profitable than DO 
firms (Kimura and Kiyota, 2007; Girma et al, 2004; Qian et al, 2003; Pfaffermayr 
and Bellak, 2000). However FO firms are, on average, less profitable then DOMs in the 
Portuguese case. 
More profitable employees mean, in the Portuguese case, higher wages paid on average. 
Once again, the literature (Gelübcke, 2013; Dobbelaere, 2004; Griffith and Simpson, 
2003; Lipsey and Sjoholm,  2003; Girma et al, 2002) indicates that FO firms tend to 
have higher wages then DOMs and DO firms. This happens in the DO firms case but 
not in DOMs.  
We can see that DO firms worked in Portugal, on average, with almost null profit 
margins (0,89%). DOMs have a profit margin of 6,95% and FOs of 4,60%.  
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Table 14. Descriptive Data – Main Variables - 2008 - 2012 
DO size age turnover gva gvaemp wages wagesemp 
Mean 41,97 20,16 4.605,67 1.379,71 27,06 565,28 12,39 
Sd 155,90 14,02 41.849,06 24.134,31 223,49 2.674,76 8,44 
Min 10 0 0,01 0,00 0,00 2,99 0,04 
Max 8574 144 4.955.272 6240424 32.262,30 227.162,20 747,64 
Median 20,00 17 1.190,24 405.151,00 18,97 227,05 10,77 
        
DOM size age turnover gva gvaemp wages wagesemp 
Mean 425,14 27,98 103.727 31.241,78 399,71 8.092,71 25,86 
Sd 1.606,96 20,10 505.219,30 121.621,50 3.530,88 26.340,85 30,98 
Min 10 0 4,09 5,38 0,06 24,00 0,73 
Max 22734 140 10.400.000,00 2334640 82.822,33 311.347,20 478,47 
Median 120 23 15594 5.202,62 39,68 2.301,04 18,64 
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Table 15.  Descriptive Data – Main Variables - 2008 – 2012, cont 
 FO size Age turnover gva gvaemp wages wagesemp 
Mean 155,36 24,90 35.015,44 11.442,10 201,99 2.854,76 24,32 
Sd 545,48 18,09 128.887 91.297,33 3.688,47 6.308,00 23,74 
Min 10 0 12 4,65 0,03 6,54 0,05 
Max 12643 107 2.432.189 5316572 241.662,40 89.690,34 515,43 
Median 44   20 7.178,10 1.957,04 37,19 996,97 19,44 
        
TOTAL size age turnover gva gvaemp wages wagesemp 
Mean 55,06 20,56 8.038,95 2.470,26 43,49 825,39 13,31 
Sd 295,02 14,48 84.503,90 35.931,55 1.021,88 4.688,71 11,19 
Min 10 0 0,01 0,00 0,00 2,99 0,04 
Max 22734 144 10.400.000,00 6240424 241.662,40 311.347,20 747,64 
Median 21,00 18 1.312,10 434.485,00 19.677,00 243.336,00 15,24 
Source: Own Elaboration based on SABI data set 
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Table 16. Descriptive Data – Main Variables - 2008 – 2012, count 
DO profmarg profemp tsales ebit netincom 
Mean 0,89 3,28 4.110,35 331,65 217,95 
Sd 16,41 91,71996 33.811,43 20.529,16 19.561,05 
Min -945,75 9.505,95 0 -41628 -73.517,30 
Max 908,98 17.398,41 4705156 6.039.844 58.89.054 
Median 1,49 0,81 1.022,36 33,86 12,03 
      
DOM profmarg profemp tsales ebit netincom 
Mean 6,95 220,09 88.806,46 8.539,99 8.191,69 
Sd 54,58 1.908,17 519.281,90 49.903,14 50.708,64 
Min -745,07 -314,48 0,07 -158.212,40 -209.049,20 
Max 930,14 32.700,16 10.300.000,00 1.169.465 832.681,70 
Median 2,79 3,94 11.472,40 651,85 323,42 
Source: Own Elaboration based on SABI data set 
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Table 17. Descriptive Data – Main Variables - 2008 – 2012, cont 
FO profmarg profemp tsales ebit netincom 
Mean 4,61 109,39 29.691,16 4.025,79 3.911,05 
Sd 24,73 3.170,75 125.401 73.109,18 72.547,61 
Min -253,49 -704,74 0 -54.110,49 -56.984,47 
Max 743,32 231.666 2.263.447 5210703 5124695 
Median 2,66 3,57 3.663,19 213,86 113,20 
      
TOTAL profmarg profemp tsales ebit netincom 
Mean 1,21 13,09 7.239,65 684,62 566,84 
Sd 18,34 805,00 84.287,83 27.221,79 26.490,78 
Min -945,75 -9.505,95 0 -158.212,40 -209.049,20 
Max 930,14 231.666 10.300.000,00 6039844 5889054 
Median 1,54 0,87 1.094,26 36,78 13,19 
Source: Own Elaboration based on SABI data set 
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Table 18. Correlation Matrix3 
 
  dom fo logage logsize manuf logage2 logsize2 
dom 1.0000 
      fo -0.0316 1.0000 
     logage 0.0502 0.0581 1.0000 
    logsize 0.2365 0.2196 0.1179 1.0000 
   manuf 0.0391 -0.0081 0.0834 0.0952 1.0000 
  logage2 0.0570 0.0661 0.9742 0.1317 0.0860 1.0000 
 logsize2 0.2525 0.2204 0.1128 0.9810 0.0770 0.1261 1.0000 
loggvaemp 0.1593 0.2443 0.1092 0.1577 -0.1225 0.1071 0.1498 
logprofemp 0.1211 0.2071 0.0714 0.0900 -0.1161 0.0739 0.0886 
wagesemp 0.1484 0.2376 0.0696 0.1139 -0.1252 0.0735 0.1094 
export 0.1381 0.1116 0.1649 0.2483 0.3671 0.1673 0.2285 
  
         loggvaemp logprofemp wagesemp export 
   loggvaemp 1.0000 
      logprofemp 0.7284 1.0000 
     wagesemp 0.6349 0.3738 1.0000 
    export 0.1922 0.1495 0.0888 1.0000 
   Source: Own elaboration based on Stata 
 
As presented in table above, the correlation matrix show a high correlation between 
Wages per employee (wagesemp) and DOM as well as Profit per employee (profemp) 
and DOM. 
                                                 
3
 Variables description in section appendix I. 
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2.5 - Econometric Approach and Estimation Issues 
Before analyzing the results, some considerations ought to be made. Considering the 
nature of the data, and that we want to guarantee that are no change of status (in 
strategic variables FO, DO and DOM), during the period in analysis, it was tested a 
Pooled OLS Model.  
Pooled Regression
4
 is usually carried out on Time-Series/Cross-Sectional data- data that 
has observations over time for several different units or cross-sections that is the case. 
This model is also known as population averaged model assuming that any latent 
heterogeneity has been averaged out (Greene, 2003). We did not consider that our 
research question allows us to use a panel data modelling approach, as it is not expected 
that there will be considerable changes in the key independent variable in the period 
analysed. So, it was used a Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression estimation 
which by the words of Park (2011, p. 19) is a “pooled linear regression” that “assumes a 
constant intercept and slopes regardless of group and time period”. 
This econometric approach was already followed in another important studies about the 
theme under analysis in this study. De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2005) have used this 
kind of estimation in their study about the advantages of foreign affiliates in terms of 
productivity. Kimura and Kiyota (2007) used pooled regression models for the period 
1990-1993 in their study about performance differences between FO and DO firms in 
the Japanese market. In a study about the relationship between multinationality and 
performance Gomes and Ramaswamy (1999) have tested their model using pooled time 
series methodology. To identify the effects of multinational diversification on the 
corporate financial performance in the Canadian market was used a “pooled time-series-
cross-sectional data for the years 1992–1994 and 1997” (Mathur et al, 2001; p. 561).  
Also Criscuolo and Martin (2009) that studied the productivity of U.S. and other 
foreign-owned plants in the United Kingdom used a pooled sample (1996-2000) to their 
descriptive statistics.  
                                                 
4
 The empirical work was performed using STATA (version 12.1.) 
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After we estimated Pooled OLS regressions, some unexpected results were emerging, 
leading us to  hypothesize that the 2008 crisis may have had a significant impact on 
firms and their characteristics, hence we decided to implement also (by simple OLS 
estimations) a cross-section approach, as done by Gelübcke (2013a). 
 
Model 
In the estimations a log-linear function (Konings, 2001). it will be applied at the firm 
level to test whether (1) Are there significant differences in the characteristics of FO 
and DO companies, in the Portuguese case?, (2) And are there significant differences in 
the characteristics of FO and DO companies, in the Portuguese case? 
The following specification is the starting point of the analysis:  
Yit = αi + βit*Xit + εit , 
Where i stands for firm i, t for year t, n for Y is the log of each one of the characteristics 
under analysis and X each of the independent variables. In this way, the models to 
estimate are the following: 
(M1): Model 1– Comparing FO firms with all Portuguese Companies 
LogProductivity it= α+ β1FO +β2LogSize it +β3LogAge it + β4LogAge2+ β5LogSize2 +β6 Manuf it+ εit  
LogProfitability it= α+ β1FO +β2LogSize it +β3LogAge it + β4LogAge2+ β5LogSize2 +β6 Manuf it+ εit  
LogWages it= α+ β1FO +β2LogSize it +β3LogAge it + β4LogAge2+ β5LogSize2 +β6 Manuf it+ εit  
Exporter
5
 it= α+ β1FO +β2LogSize it +β3LogAge it + β4LogAge2+ β5LogSize2 +β6 Manuf it+ εit  
LogSize it = α+ β1FO + β2LogAge it + β3LogAge2 + β4Manuf it + εit  
(M2): Model 2 – Comparing FO with DOM and DO 
LogProductivity it= α+ β1FO +β2DOM + β3LogSize it +β4LogAge it + β5LogAge2+ β6LogSize2 +β7 
Manuf it+ εit  
LogProfitability it= α+ β1FO +β2DOM + β3LogSize it +β4LogAge it + β5LogAge2+ β6LogSize2 +β7 
Manuf it+ εit  
                                                 
5
 Related to the characteristic Export Status, a probit model is going to be estimated, allowing to identify 
the probability of a company to be or not an exporter and how that depends of ownership. 
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LogWages it= α+ β1FO +β2DOM + β3LogSize it +β4LogAge it + β5LogAge2+ β6LogSize2 +β7 Manuf 
it+ εit  
Exporter it= α+ β1FO +β2DOM + β3LogSize it +β4LogAge it + β5LogAge2+ β6LogSize2 +β7 Manuf 
it+ εit  
LogSize it = α+ β1FO + β2DOM + β3LogAge it + β4LogAge2 + β5Manuf it + εit  
 
Model 1 (M1) allow to compare FO firms with all the kinds of Portuguese Owned 
companies, i.e, with or without FDI.  
Model 2 (M2) intends to compare FO firms with their Portuguese counterpart splitting 
these in two kinds: domestic companies with FDI (DOM) and domestic companies 
without FDI (DO). 
For each of the dependent variables it will be used the proxy referred above in table 
12.And quadratic relations it will be tested always that pertinent by including in the 
functional form log age square and log size square. 
In order to estimate if foreign ownership has direct impact in the characteristics under 
analyse it will be used a Dummy Variable that can assumes the values 1 if the company 
is FO and 0 otherwise. With a first look of the descriptive it is expected that FO has a 
positive impact in all the dependent variables. 
In this case DOM it will be a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the company it 
is Domestic owned with FDI and 0 otherwise. The use of these kind of dummies were 
already used for other authors that studied the characteristics differences between FO 
and DO firms (see for example Boardman et al, 1997; Greenaway et al, 2004; Hakkala 
et al, 2010).  
The primary estimations trough OLS showed the presence of heteroscedasticity in the 
data. In order to present consistent results it is going to be used OLS with robust 
standard errors. 
Taking in account the large number of observations and the vast number of factors 
which influence firm characteristics R-squared coefficients are normally low because 
the nature of the data (Cardoso, 2008; Gelübcke, 2013a.), and the fact that firms are 
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distinct units among themselves. Notwithstanding, the result for the STATA global 
significance test indicates the global significance of the overall estimated models. 
 
Both models it will be applied to 3 different approaches: 
1) All the data set available and extracted from SABI  
2) Only to the manufacturing companies 
3) Only manufacturing companies but controlled by subsectors6 
                                                 
6
 The subsectors used are described and explained  in Appendix II. 
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2.5.1 – Pooled OLS Regressions 
Table 19. Regression Results (M1) – All the data set available 
Variables GVA per Employee Profit per Employee Wages per Employee Exporters Size  
fo 0,65*** (0,01) 1,39*** (0,03) 0,51*** (0,01) 0,13*** (0,01) 0,80*** (0,02) 
logage 0,14*** (0,01) 0,14*** (0,01) 0,08*** (0,00) 0,07*** (0,00) 0,11*** (0,00) 
logsize 0,26*** (0,02) 0,10*** (0,01) 0,06*** (0,00) 0,10*** (0,00) 0,16*** (0,01) 
manuf -0,21*** (0,00) -0,44*** (0,01) -0,19*** (0,00) 0,33*** (0,00) 
  logage2 -0,01*** (0,00) 
        logsize2 -0,02*** (0,00) 
        
           F- test 
 
0,0000
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,10 
 
0,06 
 
0,14 
 
0,20 
 
0,07 
Nr. Obs 
 
100.756 
 
78.212 
 
39.991 
 
100.756 
 
100.756 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 20.  Regression Results (M2)  – All the data set available 
Variables GVA per Employee Profit per Employee Wages per Employee Exporters Size  
fo 0,69*** (0,01) 1,47*** (0,03) 0,54*** (0,01) 0,15*** (0,01) 0,83*** (0,02) 
dom 0,85*** (0,03) 1,62*** (0,06) 0,52*** (0,02) 0,30*** (0,01) 1,59*** (0,03) 
logage 0,15*** (0,01) 0,13*** (0,01) 0,08*** (0,00) 0,07*** (0,00) 0,10*** (0,00) 
logsize 0,30*** (0,01) 0,04*** (0,01) 0,04*** (0,00) 0,09*** (0,00) 0,15*** (0,01) 
manuf -0,22*** (0,00) -0,44*** (0,01) -0,19*** (0,00) 0,33*** (0,00) 
  logage2 -0,01*** (0,00) 
        logsize2 -0,03*** (0,00) 
        
           F- test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,12 
 
0,08 
 
0,15 
 
0,20 
 
0,12 
Nr. Obs 
 
100.756 
 
78.212 
 
39.991 
 
100.756 
 
100.756 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 21.  Regression Results (M1) – Manufacturing Companies – Not using sub sectors as control variables 
Variables GVA per Employee Profit per Employee Wages per Employee Exporters Size  
fo 0,48*** (0,02) 1,29*** (0,05) 0,37*** (0,02) 0,09*** (0,01) 1,08*** (0,03) 
logage 0,08*** (0,00) 0,05*** (0,01) 0,08*** (0,00) 0,08*** (0,00) 0,20*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,12*** (0,00) 0,22*** (0,01) 0,06*** (0,00) 0,21*** (0,00) 
  
           
           F- test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000
R2 
 
0,10 
 
0,06 
 
0,13 
 
0,16 
 
0,13 
Nr. Obs 
 
32.300 
 
25.107 
 
12.838 
 
32.300 
 
32.300 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 22. Regression Results (M2) – Manufacturing Companies - Not using sub sectors as control variables 
Variables GVA per Employee Profit per Employee Wages per Employee Exporters Size  
fo 0,48*** (0,02) 1,30*** (0,05) 0,37*** (0,02) 0,09*** (0,01) 1,08*** (0,03) 
dom 0,58*** (0,13) 1,00*** (0,35) 0,31** (0,13) 0,12*** (0,05) 1,33*** (0,19) 
logage 0,08*** (0,00) 0,05*** (0,01) 0,08*** (0,00) 0,08*** (0,00) 0,20*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,12*** (0,00) 0,21*** (0,01) 0,06*** (0,00) 0,21*** (0,00) 
  
           F- test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000
R2 
 
0,10 
 
0,06 
 
0,13 
 
0,16 
 
0,13 
Nr. Obs 
 
32.300 
 
25.107 
 
12.838 
 
32.300 
 
32.300 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 23.  Regression Results (M1) – Manufacturing Companies – With sub sectors as control variables 
Variables GVA per Employee Profit per Employee Wages per Employee Exporters Size  
fo 0,29*** (0,02) 0,91*** (0,05) 0,23*** (0,01) 0,05*** (0,01) 1,00*** (0,03) 
logage 0,12*** (0,02) -0,07*** (0,01) 0,04*** (0,00) 0,08*** (0,00) 0,23*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,21*** (0,02) 0,26*** (0,01) 0,08*** (0,00) 0,20*** (0,00) 
  logage2 -0,02*** (0,00) 
        logsize2 -0,01*** (0,00) 
        
           F- test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,34 
 
0,16 
 
0,42 
 
0,23 
 
0,18 
Nr. Obs 
 
32.300 
 
25.107 
 
12.838 
 
32.300 
 
32.300 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 24.  Regression Results (M2) – Manufacturing Companies – With sub sectors as control variables 
Variables GVA per Employee Profit per Employee Wages per Employee Exporters Size  
fo 0,30*** (0,02) 0,93*** (0,05) 0,24*** (0,02) 0,05*** (0,01) 1,01*** (0,03) 
dom 0,43*** (0,11) 0,70** (0,32) 0,18* (0,10) 0,08 (0,05) 1,31*** (0,18) 
logage 0,11*** (0,02) -0,07*** (0,01) 0,04*** (0,00) 0,08*** (0,00) 0,23*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,22*** (0,02) 0,27*** (0,01) 0,09*** (0,00) 0,20*** (0,00) 
  logage2 -0,02*** (0,00) 
        logsize2 -0,01*** (0,00) 
        
           F- test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,34 
 
0,16 
 
0,41 
 
0,23 
 
0,18 
Nr, Obs 
 
32.300 
 
25.107 
 
12.838 
 
32.300 
 
32.300 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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2.5.2 – Cross Section Regressions  
To the cross-section estimations it was done a deeply analysis of the data. There were 
found some outliers that due the nature of their data can be considered data set errors. 
These outliers were not considered in our estimations being dropped by using in each 
case an appropriate filter. These eliminations have changed the number of our 
observations. So the final sample used in the cross section estimations is reported in 
table 25 below.  
Table 25.  Final Sample to Cross Section Estimations 
All Data set 
DO 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Obs 19.255 19.275 19.270 19.180 18.996 
DOM 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Obs 355 360 360 353 356 
FO 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Obs 1.197 1.199 1.198 1.180 1.171 
 
 Manufacturing Companies 
DO 
     Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Obs 6.106 6.106 6.106 6.106 6.106 
DOM 
     Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Obs 112 156 164 144 144 
FO 
     Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Obs 353 353 353 353 353 
Source: Own Elaboration based on Sabi dataset 
 
The cross section analysis will allow us to have a better understanding of how 
dependent variables have evolved from year to year.  
For purposes of global and individual significance, the squared age and size variables 
were not applied to every single model that we are about to present.  
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We will follow the structure of the previous section, presenting the results for the full 
database, then only manufacture and lastly manufacturing controlling for subsector. 
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Regression Results – All the data set available 
Table 26.  Cross Section Regression - Productivity 
Gross Value Added per Employee 
(M1) Variables 2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
fo 0,47*** (0,02) 
 
0,42*** (0,02) 
 
0,42*** (0,02) 
logage 0,10*** (0,01) 
 
0,10*** (0,01) 
 
0,09*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,04*** (0,01) 
 
0,05*** (0,01) 
 
0,06*** (0,01) 
manuf -0,18*** (0,01) 
 
-0,19*** (0,01) 
 
-0,17*** (0,01) 
         F- test 
 
0,0000 
  
0,0000 
  
0,0000 
R2 0,08 
 
0,07 
 
0,07 
Nr. Obs 20.063 
 
20.385 
 
20.392 
 
2011 
 
2012 
   fo 0,44*** (0,02) 
 
0,43*** (0,02) 
   logage 0,09*** (0,01) 
 
0,08*** (0,01) 
   logsize 0,08*** (0,01) 
 
0,12*** (0,01) 
   manuf -0,16*** (0,01) 
 
-0,13*** (0,01) 
          F- test 0,0000 
 
0,0000 
   R2 0,07 
 
0,07 
   Nr. Obs 20.283 
 
20.126 
   GVA per Employee 
(M2) Variables 2008   2009   2010 
fo 0,49*** (0,02) 
 
0,45*** (0,02) 
 
0,44*** (0,02) 
dom 0,55*** (0,04) 
 
0,61*** (0,03) 
 
0,47*** (0,04) 
logage 0,10*** (0,01) 
 
0,09*** (0,01) 
 
0,09*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,03*** (0,01) 
 
0,03*** (0,01) 
 
0,05*** (0,01) 
manuf -0,18*** (0,01) 
 
-0,19*** (0,01) 
 
-0,17*** (0,01) 
  
        F- test 
 
0,0000 
  
0,0000 
  
0,0000 
R^2 
 
0,09 
  
0,09 
  
0,08 
Nr. Obs 
 
20.063 
  
20.382 
  
20.384 
  2011  2012     
fo 0,46*** (0,02) 
 
0,45*** (0,02) 
   dom 0,39*** (0,04) 
 
0,39*** (0,04) 
   logage 0,09*** (0,01) 
 
0,08*** (0,01) 
   logsize 0,06*** (0,01) 
 
0,10*** (0,01) 
   manuf -0,16*** (0,01) 
 
-0,13*** (0,01) 
     
        F- test 
 
0,0000 
  
0,0000 
   R2 
 
0,08 
  
0,08 
   Nr. Obs 
 
20.275   20.111 
   Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 27. Cross Section Regression - Profitability 
Profit per Employee 
(M1) Variables 2008   2009   2010 
fo 1,03*** (0,06) 
 
0,92*** (0,06) 
 
1,04*** (0,06) 
logage 0,15*** (0,02) 
 
0,16*** (0,02) 
 
0,15*** (0,02) 
logsize -0,04** (0,02) 
 
0,01 (0,02) 
 
0,07*** (0,02) 
manuf -0,43*** (0,03) 
 
-0,37*** (0,03) 
 
-0,40*** (0,02) 
  
        F- test 
 
0,0000
  
0,0000
  
0,0000
R^2 
 
0,04 
  
0,04 
  
0,04 
Nr. Obs  15.331   15.446   16.900 
  2011   2012       
fo 1,11*** (0,06) 
 
1,09*** (0,06) 
   logage 0,17*** (0,02) 
 
0,17*** (0,02) 
   logsize 0,10*** (0,02) 
 
0,18*** (0,02) 
   manuf -0,33*** (0,03) 
 
-0,31*** (0,03) 
     
        F- test 
 
0,0000
  
0,0000
   R2 
 
0,04 
  
0,05 
   Nr. Obs  15.661   14.241    
Profit per Employee 
(M2) Variables 2008   2009   2010 
fo 1,08*** (0,06) 
 
0,97*** (0,06) 
 
1,09*** (0,06) 
dom 1,12*** (0,10) 
 
1,13*** (0,09) 
 
1,24*** (0,09) 
logage 0,15*** (0,02) 
 
0,15*** (0,02) 
 
0,15*** (0,02) 
logsize -0,07*** (0,02) 
 
-0,03* (0,02) 
 
0,03* (0,02) 
manuf -0,42*** (0,03) 
 
-0,38*** (0,03) 
 
-0,40*** (0,02) 
  
        F- test 
 
0,0000
  
0,0000
  
0,0000
R2 
 
0,05 
  
0,05 
  
0,05 
Nr. Obs 
 
15.331 
  
15.446 
  
16.900 
  2011  2012     
fo 1,15*** (0,06) 
 
1,14*** (0,06) 
   dom 0,96*** (0,10) 
 
0,82*** (0,11) 
   logage 0,17*** (0,02) 
 
0,17*** (0,02) 
   logsize 0,07*** (0,02) 
 
0,14*** (0,02) 
   manuf -0,34*** (0,03) 
 
-0,31*** (0,03) 
     
        F- test 
 
0,0000
  
0,0000
   R2 
 
0,05 
  
0,05 
   Nr. Obs 
 
15.661 
  
14.241 
   Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 28. Cross Section Regression - Wages per Employee 
Wages per Employee 
(M1) Variables 2008   2009 
fo 0,45*** (0,02) 
 
0,42*** (0,02) 
logage 0,08*** (0,00) 
 
0,07*** (0,00) 
logsize 0,04*** (0,00) 
 
0,04*** (0,00) 
manuf -0,16*** (0,01) 
 
-0,17*** (0,01) 
      F value 
 
0,0000 
  
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,11 
  
0,11 
Nr. Obs   19.889     20.032 
Wages per Employee 
(M2) Variables 2008   2009 
fo 0,46*** (0,02) 
 
0,42*** (0,02) 
dom 0,56*** (0,05) 
 
0,45*** (0,03) 
logage 0,08*** (0,00) 
 
0,07*** (0,00) 
logsize 0,04*** (0,00) 
 
0,04*** (0,00) 
manuf -0,16*** (0,01) 
 
-0,17*** (0,01) 
  
     F value 
 
0,0000 
  
0,0000 
R^2 
 
0,12 
  
0,12 
Nr, Obs   19.889     20.032 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 29.  Cross Section Regression - Exporter 
Exporter 
(M1) Variables 2008   2009   2010 
fo 0,15*** (0,01) 
 
0,14*** (0,01) 
 
0,14*** (0,01) 
logage 0,05*** (0,00) 
 
0,06*** (0,00) 
 
0,08*** (0,00) 
logsize 0,10*** (0,00) 
 
0,10*** (0,00) 
 
0,10*** (0,00) 
manuf 0,34*** (0,01) 
 
0,34*** (0,01) 
 
0,34*** (0,01) 
         F value 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 0,0000 
  
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,19 
  
0,20 
  
0,20 
Nr. Obs  20.063   20.382   20.384 
  2011   2012       
fo 0,14*** (0,01) 
 
0,14*** (0,01) 
   logage 0,08*** (0,00) 
 
0,09*** (0,00) 
   logsize 0,10*** (0,00) 
 
0,11*** (0,00) 
   manuf 0,33*** (0,01) 
 
0,33*** (0,01) 
     
        F value 
 
0,0000 
  
0,0000 
   R2 
 
0,20 
  
0,21 
   Nr. Obs  20.275   20.111    
Exporter 
(M2) Variables 2008   2009   2010 
fo 0,16*** (0,01) 
 
0,16*** (0,01) 
 
0,15*** (0,01) 
dom 0,29*** (0,02) 
 
0,34*** (0,02) 
 
0,36*** (0,02) 
logage 0,05*** (0,00) 
 
0,06*** (0,00) 
 
0,07*** (0,00) 
logsize 0,09*** (0,00) 
 
0,09*** (0,00) 
 
0,09*** (0,00) 
manuf 0,34*** (0,01) 
 
0,34*** (0,01) 
 
0,33*** (0,01) 
  
        F value 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 0,0000 
  
0,0000 
R^2 
 
0,20 
  
0,20 
  
0,21 
Nr. Obs 
 
20.063 
  
20.382 
  
20.384 
  2011  2012     
fo 0,15*** (0,01) 
 
0,15*** (0,01) 
   dom 0,32*** (0,02) 
 
0,31*** (0,02) 
   logage 0,08*** (0,00) 
 
0,09*** (0,00) 
   logsize 0,09*** (0,00) 
 
0,09*** (0,00) 
   manuf 0,33*** (0,01) 
 
0,33*** (0,01) 
     
        F value 
 
0,0000 
  
0,0000 
   R^2 
 
0,21 
  
0,21 
   Nr. Obs 
 
20.275 
  
20.111 
   Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 30.  Cross Section Regression - Size 
 
SIZE 
(M1) Variables 2008   2009   2010 
fo 0,80*** (0,04) 
 
0,80*** (0,04) 
 
0,81*** (0,04) 
logage 0,14*** (0,01) 
 
0,11*** (0,01) 
 
0,11*** (0,01) 
manuf 0,16*** (0,01) 
 
0,14*** (0,01) 
 
0,14*** (0,01) 
      
  
  
   F value 
 
0,0000 
  
0,0000 
  
0,0000 
R2   0,07 
  
0,06 
  
0,06 
Nr. Obs   20.063     20.382     20.384 
  2011   2012       
fo 0,80*** (0,04) 
 
0,79*** (0,04) 
   logage 0,09*** (0,01) 
 
0,10*** (0,01) 
   manuf 0,17*** (0,01) 
 
0,19*** (0,01) 
         
  
  
   F value 
 
0,0000 
  
0,0000 
   R2   0,06 
  
0,06 
   Nr. Obs   20.275     20.111       
Size 
(M2) Variables 2008   2009   2010 
fo 0,83*** (0,04) 
 
0,82*** (0,04) 
 
0,83*** (0,04) 
dom 1,28*** (0,08) 
 
1,45*** (0,07) 
 
1,34*** (0,07) 
logage 0,13*** (0,01) 
 
0,10*** (0,01) 
 
0,09*** (0,01) 
manuf 0,16*** (0,01) 
 
0,13*** (0,01) 
 
0,12*** (0,01) 
  
        F value 
 
0,0000
  
0,0000
  
0,0000
R^2 
 
0,11 
  
0,11 
  
0,10 
Nr. Obs 
 
20.063 
  
20.382 
  
20.384 
  2011  2012     
fo 0,83*** (0,04) 
 
0,83*** (0,04) 
   dom 1,75*** (0,06) 
 
2,52*** (0,07) 
   logage 0,08*** (0,01) 
 
0,08*** (0,01) 
   manuf 0,14*** (0,01) 
 
0,16*** (0,01) 
     
        F value 
 
0,0000
  
0,0000
   R^2 
 
0,12 
  
0,18 
   Nr. Obs 
 
20.275   20.111 
   Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Manufacturing Companies – Not using sub sectors as control variables 
Table 31. Cross Section Regression - Productivity 
GVA per Employee 
(M1) Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 0,46*** (0,04) 0,43*** (0,04) 0,46*** (0,04) 
logage 0,09*** (0,01) 0,09*** (0,01) 0,09*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,12*** (0,01) 0,12*** (0,01) 0,12*** (0,01) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
R2 
 
0,11 
 
0,10 
 
0,11 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.512 
 
6.623 
 
6.628 
  2011 2012    
fo 0,43*** (0,04) 0,42*** (0,04) 
  logage 0,07*** (0,01) 0,09*** (0,01) 
  logsize 0,17*** (0,01) 0,18*** (0,01) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
  R2 
 
0,13 
 
0,12 
  Nr. Obs  6.662  6.625   
GVA per Employee 
(M2) Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 0,49*** (0,04) 0,49*** (0,04) 0,49*** (0,04) 
dom 0,59*** (0,06) 0,61*** (0,05) 0,35*** (0,06) 
logage 0,10*** (0,01) 0,09*** (0,01) 0,09*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,10** (0,01) 0,09*** (0,01) 0,10*** (0,01) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,00 
R2 
 
0,13 
 
0,12 
 
0,12 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.512 
 
6.623 
 
6.628 
  2011 2012     
fo 0,49*** (0,04) 0,46*** (0,04)     
dom 0,49*** (0,07) 0,43*** (0,06) 
  logage 0,08*** (0,01) 0,10*** (0,01) 
  logsize 0,13*** (0,01) 0,14*** (0,01) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
  R2 
 
0,14 
 
0,13 
  Nr. Obs 
 
6.662   6.625 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 32.  Cross Section Regression - Profitability 
Profit per Employee 
(M1) Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 1,20*** (0,11) 1,11*** (0,11) 1,24*** (0,10) 
logage 0,09*** (0,03) 0,07*** (0,03) 0,06** (0,03) 
logsize 0,15*** (0,03) 0,24*** (0,03) 0,25*** (0,03) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
R2 
 
0,05 
 
0,06 
 
0,06 
Nr. Obs 
 
4.988 
 
4.899 
 
5.594 
  2011 2012    
fo 1,14*** (0,11) 1,22*** (0,10) 
  logage 0,04 (0,03) 0,07** (0,04) 
  logsize 0,37*** (0,03) 0,40*** (0,03) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
  R2 
 
0,08 
 
0,10 
  Nr. Obs  5.238  4.965   
Profit per Employee 
(M2) Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 1,26*** (0,11) 1,21*** (0,11) 1,33*** (0,10) 
dom 1,10*** (0,17) 1,03*** (0,14) 1,10*** (0,12) 
logage 0,10*** (0,03) 0,08*** (0,03) 0,06** (0,03) 
logsize 0,11*** (0,03) 0,17*** (0,03) 0,19*** (0,03) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
R2 
 
0,06 
 
0,07 
 
0,07 
Nr, Obs 
 
4.988 
 
4.899 
 
5.594 
  2011 2012    
fo 1,28*** (0,11) 1,32*** (0,10)     
dom 1,18*** (0,16) 1,03*** (0,16) 
  logage 0,05 (0,03) 0,08** (0,04) 
  logsize 0,27*** (0,03) 0,33*** (0,03) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
  R2 
 
0,09 
 
0,10 
  Nr, Obs 
 
5.238  4.965 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 33.  Cross Section Regression – Wages per Employee 
Wages per Employee 
(M1) Variables 2008 2009 
fo 0,37*** (0,02) 0,35*** (0,02) 
logage 0,08*** (0,01) 0,08*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,07*** (0,01) 0,07*** (0,01) 
  
    F test 
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
R2 
 
0,14 
 
0,13 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.448 
 
6.493 
 Wages per Employee 
(M2) Variables 2008 2009 
fo 0,38*** (0,02) 0,36*** (0,02) 
dom 0,43*** (0,06) 0,35*** (0,04) 
logage 0,08*** (0,01) 0,08*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,07*** (0,01) 0,06*** (0,01) 
     F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,14 
 
0,14 
Nr, Obs 
 
6.448 
 
6.493 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 34.  Cross Section Regression - Exporter 
Exporter 
(M1)Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 0,09*** (0,02) 0,09*** (0,02) 0,08*** (0,02) 
logage 0,06*** (0,01) 0,08*** (0,01) 0,09*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,20*** (0,01) 0,20*** (0,01) 0,21*** (0,01) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,16 
 
0,17 
 
0,17 
Nr Obs 
 
6.512 
 
6.623 
 
6.628 
  2011 2012     
fo 0,09*** (0,02) 0,09*** (0,02) 
  logage 0,10*** (0,01) 0,11*** (0,01) 
  logsize 0,21*** (0,01) 0,21*** (0,01) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
  R2 
 
0,18 
 
0,18 
  Nr. Obs   6.662   6.625     
Exporter 
(M2)Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 0,10*** (0,02) 0,10*** (0,02) 0,09*** (0,02) 
dom 0,13*** (0,03) 0,15*** (0,02) 0,15*** (0,02) 
logage 0,06*** (0,01) 0,08*** (0,01) 0,09*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,19*** (0,01) 0,20*** (0,01) 0,20*** (0,01) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
R2 
 
0,16 
 
0,17 
 
0,17 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.512 
 
6.623 
 
6.628 
  2011 2012     
fo 0,09*** (0,02) 0,09*** (0,02)     
dom 0,04** (0,02) -0,01 (0,02) 
  logage 0,10*** (0,01) 0,11*** (0,01) 
  logsize 0,20*** (0,01) 0,21*** (0,01) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
  R2 
 
0,18 
 
0,18 
  Nr. Obs 
 
6.662  6.625  
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 35.  Cross Section Regression - Size 
Size 
(M1) Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 1,07*** (0,07) 1,04*** (0,06) 1,04*** (0,06) 
logage 0,22*** (0,01) 0,22*** (0,01) 0,22*** (0,01) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
R2 
 
0,14 
 
0,13 
 
0,12 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.512 
 
6.623 
 
6.628 
  2011 2012    
fo 1,00*** (0,07) 1,00*** (0,07) 
  logage 0,23*** (0,02) 0,22*** (0,02) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000
 
0,0000
  R2 
 
0,10 
 
0,09 
  Nr. Obs  6.662  6.625   
Size 
(M2) Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 1,09*** (0,07) 1,08*** (0,06) 1,08*** (0,06) 
dom 1,47*** (0,12) 1,53*** (0,08) 1,33*** (0,08) 
logage 0,22*** (0,01) 0,20 (0,01) 0,20*** (0,01) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,19 
 
0,20 
 
0,18 
Nr, Obs 
 
6.512 
 
6.623 
 
6.628 
Variables 2011 2012     
fo 1,07*** (0,07) 1,07*** (0,07)     
dom 1,97*** (0,05) 2,25*** (0,06) 
  logage 0,20*** (0,02) 0,20*** (0,02) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
  R2 
 
0,24 
 
0,24 
  Nr, Obs 
 
6.662   6.625     
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Manufacturing Companies – Using sub sectors as control variable 
Table 36. Cross Section Regression - Productivity 
GVA per Employee 
(M1) Variables  2008 2009 2010 
fo 0,29*** (0,04) 0,26*** (0,04) 0,27*** (0,03) 
logage 0,03*** (0,01) 0,01 (0,01) 0,01 (0,01) 
logsize 0,14*** (0,01) 0,16*** (0,01) 0,15*** (0,01) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,38 
 
0,36 
 
0,37 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.512 
 
6.623 
 
6.628 
           
  2011 2012     
fo 0,26*** (0,03) 0,26*** (0,04)     
logage -0,01 (0,01) 0,01 (0,01) 
  logsize 0,20*** (0,01) 0,19*** (0,01) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
  R2 
 
0,36 
 
0,31 
  Nr. Obs 
 
6.662 
 
6.625 
  GVA per Employee 
(M2) Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 0,31*** (0,04) 0,30*** (0,04) 0,29*** (0,03) 
dom 0,25*** (0,06) 0,40*** (0,05) 0,17*** (0,06) 
logage 0,03*** (0,01) 0,01 (0,01) 0,01 (0,01) 
logsize 0,13*** (0,01) 0,14*** (0,01) 0,14*** (0,01) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,38 
 
0,37 
 
0,37 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.512 
 
6.623 
 
6.628 
           
  2011 2012     
fo 0,30*** (0,03) 0,28*** (0,04)     
dom 0,33*** (0,06) 0,18*** (0,05) 
  logage 0,00 (0,01) 0,01 (0,01) 
  logsize 0,17*** (0,01) 0,18*** (0,01) 
  
       F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
  R2 
 
0,36 
 
0,31 
  Nr. Obs 
 
6.662 
 
6.625   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 37.  Cross Section Regression - Profitability 
Profit per Employee 
Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 0,89*** (0,11) 0,77*** (0,11) 0,88*** (0,10) 
logage 0,00 (0,03) -0,05* (0,03) -0,07** (0,03) 
logsize 0,17*** (0,03) 0,28** (0,03) 0,29*** (0,03) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,17 
 
0,16 
 
0,17 
Nr. Obs 
 
4.988 
 
4.899 
 
5.594 
           
  2011 2012     
fo 0,81*** (0,10) 0,94*** (0,10)     
logage -0,08** (0,03) -0,05 (0,04) 
  logsize 0,40*** (0,03) 0,42*** (0,03) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
  R2 
 
0,18 
 
0,18 
  Nr. Obs 
 
5.238 
 
4.965 
  Profit per Employee 
Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 0,92*** (0,11) 0,85*** (0,11) 0,95*** (0,10) 
dom 0,46*** (0,16) 0,78*** (0,14) 0,83*** (0,12) 
logage 0,00 (0,03) -0,04 (0,03) -0,06** (0,03) 
logsize 0,16*** (0,03) 0,23*** (0,03) 0,25*** (0,03) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,17 
 
0,17 
 
0,18 
Nr. Obs 
 
4.988 
 
4.899 
 
5.594 
           
  2011 2012     
fo 0,92*** (0,10) 1,00*** (0,10)     
dom 0,88*** (0,15) 0,58*** (0,15) 
  logage -0,07** (0,03) -0,05 (0,03) 
  logsize 0,32*** (0,03) 0,38*** (0,03) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
  R2 
 
0,19 
 
0,19 
  Nr. Obs 
 
5.238 
 
4.965   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
 72 
Table 38.  Cross Section Regression – Wages per Employee 
Wages per Employee 
Variables 2008 2009 
fo 0,24*** (0,02) 0,22*** (0,02) 
logage 0,04*** (0,01) 0,03*** (0,00) 
logsize 0,09*** (0,01) 0,09*** (0,01) 
     F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,42 
 
0,41 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.448 
 
6.493 
Wages per Employee 
Variables 2008 2009 
fo 0,25*** (0,02) 0,23*** (0,02) 
dom 0,22*** (0,06) 0,21*** (0,05) 
logage 0,04*** (0,01) 0,03*** (0,00) 
logsize 0,10*** (0,01) 0,09*** (0,01) 
     F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,42 
 
0,42 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.448 
 
6.493 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 39.  Cross Section Regression - Exporter 
Exporter 
Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 0,06*** (0,02) 0,05*** (0,02) 0,05** (0,02) 
logage 0,06*** (0,01) 0,07** (0,01) 0,08*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,19*** (0,01) 0,20*** (0,01) 0,20*** (0,01) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,22 
 
0,23 
 
0,24 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.512 
 
6.623 
 
6.628 
           
Variables 2011 2012     
fo 0,05** (0,02) 0,06*** (0,02)     
logage 0,09*** (0,01) 0,10*** (0,01) 
  logsize 0,20*** (0,01) 0,20*** (0,01) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
  R2 
 
0,24 
 
0,25 
  Nr. Obs 
 
6.662 
 
6.625 
  Exporter 
Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 0,07*** (0,02) 0,06*** (0,02) 0,05** (0,02) 
dom 0,06* (0,04) 0,13*** (0,02) 0,09*** (0,02) 
logage 0,06*** (0,01) 0,07*** (0,01) 0,08*** (0,01) 
logsize 0,19*** (0,01) 0,19*** (0,01) 0,20*** (0,01) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,22 
 
0,23 
 
0,24 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.512 
 
6.623 
 
6.628 
             
Variables 2011 2012     
fo 0,06** (0,02) 0,05** (0,02)     
dom 0,04** (0,02) 0,06*** (0,02) 
  logage 0,09*** (0,01) 0,10*** (0,01) 
  logsize 0,20*** (0,01) 0,20*** (0,01) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
  R2 
 
0,24 
 
0,25 
  Nr. Obs 
 
6.662 
 
6.625   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Table 40.  Cross Section Regression - Size 
Size 
Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 0,98*** (0,06) 0,97*** (0,06) 0,97*** (0,06) 
logage 0,24*** (0,01) 0,24*** (0,01) 0,25*** (0,01) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,18 
 
0,17 
 
0,16 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.512 
 
6.623 
 
6.628 
           
Variables 2011 2012     
fo 0,92*** (0,06) 0,90*** (0,06)     
logage 0,25*** (0,02) 0,25*** (0,02) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
  R2 
 
0,17 
 
0,15 
  Nr. Obs 
 
6.662 
 
6.625   
Size 
Variables 2008 2009 2010 
fo 1,02*** 0,06 1,02*** (0,06) 1,02*** (0,06) 
dom 1,44*** 0,11 1,55*** (0,08) 1,33*** (0,08) 
logage 0,24*** 0,01 0,23*** (0,01) 0,23*** (0,01) 
  
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
R2 
 
0,23 
 
0,24 
 
0,22 
Nr. Obs 
 
6.512 
 
6.623 
 
6.628 
           
Variables 2011 2012     
fo 1,01*** (0,06) 1,00*** (0,06)     
dom 1,88*** (0,05) 2,19*** (0,06) 
  logage 0,23*** (0,02) 0,24*** (0,02) 
    
      F test 
 
0,0000 
 
0,0000 
  R2 
 
0,29 
 
0,29 
  Nr. Obs 
 
6.662 
 
6.625 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Elaboration based on STATA regression analysis 
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Chapter 3 – Results and Discussions 
3.1 – Pooled OLS 
This section analyzes and discusses the findings of the previous section. 
Concerning the Pooled OLS estimations, we run the log-log regression and first of all it 
is important to notice that all the results are significant at a level of 1% when we use full 
data set available. If we use only manufacturing companies all the results are significant 
at level 1% with exception dom in wages per employee (5% significance. We control 
the manufacturing sample to subsectors dom in wages per employee it is significant at a 
level of 5% and dom in exporter it is not significant. All the other variables are 
significant at a level of 1% for this sample. The log model fits properly the data (F test), 
as we can see in tables above.  
Using all the data set available, for both models, it is verified that FO has a positive and 
significant impact on all the characteristics under analysis. However, when the impact 
of FO and DOM is compared in M2 it is clear that that the impact of DOM is higher 
than the FO in all the characteristics with the exception of wages per employee, in line 
with the descriptive statistics. These results are in the line with findings by Iyer (2009) 
in Indian Market. 
The findings, using all data set controlling the function only for FO, show that these 
firms are more profitable then Portuguese owned companies 1,39% and 0,65% more 
productive. But the results are different if both dummies (with DOM) are used at the 
same time. It is possible to identify that DOM are expected to be 0,15 p.p more 
profitable than FO and 0,16 p.p more productive (table 19 and 20). 
The positive sign in logage and logsize, and negative in quadratic form, not only show a 
positive impact in Productivity as well as establish an inverted U shape relationship 
between these two variables and GVA per employee. Having this in mind and that, as 
we can see in both estimation, in table 19 and 20, the size tend to grow with age, it 
seems that are an optimal point of productivity. It is also possible to confirm findings of 
Qian et al (2003) that new firms have better performance than older firms. 
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A negative sign was expected in the relationship between size and profitability. 
However, the findings are different, what seems to indicate that, in Portugal, DOM and 
FO larger firms tend to be more profitable. Nonetheless it was not possible to estimate a 
quadratic relationship between this two variables to identify if there are or not an 
inverted U shaped relationship between them.  
Results indicate that is more likely to find an exporter company among DOM than any 
other group. 
When the data set is used only for the manufacturing companies’ sample, without 
controlling the estimations with subsectors (table 21 and 22), the results shows some 
different findings and conclusions in this more homogeneous group. DOM (0,58) still to 
have a higher impact over productivity than FO (0,48), however the results changed in 
terms of profitability, showing that in the case of manufacturing companies the 
foreignness has a higher impact with FO firm being more profitable in 0,30 p.p.  
Controlling this group for subsectors (table 23 and 24), a first insight of the results, is 
important to emphasize the increase of R square in the statistics to this controlled 
homogenous group. The findings are almost the same without controlling for subsectors 
except that were not possible to find a statistic significance relation between DOM and 
the probability of the company to be an Exporter.  
In the manufacturing group it is possible verify that FO outperform DOM in terms of 
profitability what possible means a better resources allocation related to them need to be 
more efficient to overcome the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). 
As expected age, in pooled regressions, have a positive and statistically significant 
relation with all the characteristics under analysis. However when controlling for 
subsectors age shows a negative and statistically significant relation with profitability 
but it was not possible confirm a quadratic relation. 
Beside the expected, and already not confirmed, negative relation between size and 
profitability the signs of all coefficients confirm the positive expected relation between 
this variable and all the characteristics.  
Independent of what data set is used results show the importance of multinationality per 
se on firm characteristics confirming the Ownership advantages (Dunning, 1988). As 
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Pfaffermayr and Bellak (2000) argued the gaps between firms are many times more 
related to being part of a multinational network than specifically with foreign 
ownership.  
In the Portguese case FO are larger, more profitable, more productive, pay higher 
wages, then DO but it does not happen when compared with Portuguese owned 
Multinationals (DOM) with the latter outperforming the first in terms of productivity, 
profitability, size and probability of being an exporter company (see table 19). 
 
3.2 – Cross Section 
The cross section estimations allow identifying, year by year, the impact that each 
independent variable has in the dependent variables and complements the pooled 
analysis with a dynamic overview. Once again it is important to highlight the 
significance of all the tests done.  
Analyzing the results in terms o productivity it can be identified that FO firms are, on 
average, more productive than Portuguese owned companies (table 26).  
However this dynamic overview of the results allows identifying an interesting aspect 
when comparing FO with DOM. Between 2008 and 2010 DOM have higher impact that 
FO on GVA per employee, but it starts to decrease in 2009 being lower in 2011 and 
2012. The same happens in terms of profitability (table 27). This can suggest that 
foreign firms are more efficient during periods in what the economy is running 
smoothly (Godart et al, 2012b). 
In terms of wages per employee (table 28), there are only results for 2008 and 2009. It is 
possible to identify that DOM pay higher wages on average to their employees than FO 
and DO. These results seem to be inconsistent with the pooled regression that has 
shown a FO higher wages per employee. It is also interesting notice that manufacturing 
companies tend to pay lower wages then non manufacturing companies. 
From table 29, the probit model, shows that it is more likely to find a exporter company, 
in all the years, among DOMs as predicted before. Cross-section results confirm that FO 
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are, on average, large than average Portuguese Owned companies (table 30) but DOM 
are larger than FO rejecting H4.1.  
In the manufacturing sector (table 31) there are a similar results, for productivity, 
however instead of starts in 2009 it does in 2010. For this group of companies the H2.1 
and H2.2 are confirmed. The statistically significant regression and results show that FO 
firms are more profitable than Portuguese companies (table 32) what is in line for 
instance with finding of Kimura and Kiyota (2007) for Japonese market.  
Also in this sector a cross section analysis shows a positive relation between size and 
profitability what rejects, once again, our expectations.  
The results of wages per employee, to manufacturing sector, corroborates those found 
by Lipsey and Sjoholm (2003) Girma et al (2002) who argue that FO firms have higher 
wages relative to domestic companies. It is also possible from the results conclude that, 
as can be seen in table 33, wage premium is not properly related to ownership but more 
with multinationality (Dobbelaere, 2004) because DOM also pay higher wages. 
By using the probit model to identify if a company exports or not, with the cross section 
approach, results show that FO and DOM are more likely to be exporters, but the 
comparison between these two groups depends on the year analyzed (table 34). 
The manufacturing sector cross section regression also confirms the results found with 
pooled OLS estimations that FO firms are larger than average Portuguese domestic 
companies (Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 2000; Howenstine and Zeile, 1994) but smaller 
than DOM (table 35). 
The independent variables age and size present, to manufacturing sector, a positive and 
statistically significant relation with all the characteristics what means that when age 
and size grow have a positive impact in productivity, profitability, wages, probability to 
export and size. 
Controlling the cross section approach to manufacturing subsectors it is important, once 
again, highlight that the R2 of the regressions increases significantly in all the 
regressions.  
The findings follow the same path as those already reported in the other estimations. 
Age and size still present a positive relation with all the characteristics (see tables 36 -
 79 
40). It is possible to confirm again H2.1, H2.2, H5.1 and H5.2. FO firms are more 
profitable than DO and DOM (table 37), and that pay higher wages (table 38), on 
average, to their employees than the other counterparts in analysis.  
The conclusion in terms of productivity depends the year set in analysis. FO is more 
productive, in all the years, than Portuguese manufacturing companies as a set, 
confirming H1.2, but when compared with manufacturing DOM there are some years 
where the latter show higher productivity( table 36) rejecting H1.2. 
Once again the results for exporter probit model depends on the year analyzed. DOMs 
are the larger companies of the manufacturing sector (table 40) what rejects H4.1 but 
support H4.2. 
In Appendix III it is possible to see the conclusion of each regression (Pooled and Cross 
section) to all the hypotheses postulated in this study. 
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Chapter 4 – Conclusions, Policy Implications and Future 
Researches 
4.1 – Conclusions 
This dissertation analyzed and tested if there are significant differences on the 
characteristics of FO subsidiaries and Portuguese owned companies. In order to not 
compare “apples with oranges” the Portuguese companies were split into two different 
groups: Portuguese companies with FDI (DOM) and without FDI (DO). 
The descriptive, pooled OLS and cross section results show that, in the characteristics 
under analysis, there are significant differences in the groups of companies covered. 
After pooled and cross section regressions and a deeply analysis is safe to argue that, 
from the data analyzed, DOM outstand. They are more productive, profitable, pay 
higher wages, are larger and seem to likely be exporters. These results rejects our 
hypothesis that FO are more productive, profitable, pay higher wages and larger than 
DOM. 
Nonetheless it is very important to refer that, beside the interesting results and findings, 
all our results confirm the postulated hypothesis that FO are more productive, 
profitable, pay higher wages, are larger and more likely to be exporter than DO. 
 
4.2 – Policy Implications 
The conclusions and results of this study point to some relevant policy implications. 
First of all, the superior performance of DOM on the Portuguese market when 
compared with FO subsidiaries show that is important to support the internationalization 
of Portuguese companies.  
Besides that, once that in almost all the characteristics FO firms show better 
characteristics than DO firms without FDI it is rational to seek and attract FO 
subsidiaries to Portugal. Not only because of the shown better performance as noted by 
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Markusen and Venables (1999), but also because they tend to generate competition and 
efficiency.  
Another implication is that Portuguese authorities should develop and implement 
specific programs aiming to transfer best practices from DOMs to DOs.  
4.3 – Future Researches  
Future research can go further in the analysis of characteristics` differences between FO 
and DO firms by splitting the latter not only in DOM and DO firms but also in DO 
exporters and non exporters. 
It would be interesting in future research to cover other characteristics that were not in 
this study due the limitations of the available (SABI) dataset. 
If the dataset would be available, it would be interesting to compare the differences in 
the characteristics between FO subsidiaries and DOM subsidiaries. 
This kind of study could also be applied to other countries.  
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Appendix I 
 
Variables and description 
 
Variable Description 
do dummy for DO companies 
fo dummy for FO companies 
age Age of the company 
manuf Dummy for manufacturing companies 
size Number of employees 
turnover Turnover in th EUR 
tassets Total Assets in th EUR 
gva Gross Value Added in th EUR 
gvaemp Gross Value Added per employee in th EUR 
wages Wages in th EUR 
profmarg Profit Margin in th EUR 
profemp Profit per Employee in th EUR 
avcosemp Average cost per employee in % 
tsales Total sales in th EUR 
ebit EBIT in th EUR 
export dummy exporter 
netincom Net Income in th EUR 
logage Log age of acomapny 
logsize Log(size) 
logage2 Log age of company, squared 
logsize2 Log number of employees, squared 
loggvaemp Log gva per employee 
logprofemp Log profit per employee 
wagesemp Wages per employee 
logwagesemp Log wages per employee 
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Appendix II 
Manufacturing subsectors 
Sector Sector Description 
Sector_10 Manufacture of food products 
Sector_11 Manufacture of beverages 
Sector_12 Manufacture of tobacco products 
Sector_13 Manufacture of textiles 
Sector_14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 
Sector_15 Manufacture of leather and related products 
Sector_16 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
Sector_17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
Sector_18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
Sector_19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 
Sector_20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
Sector_21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 
Sector_22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
Sector_23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
Sector_24 Manufacture of basic metals 
Sector_25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment 
Sector_26 Manufacture of computer, eletronic and optical products 
Sector_27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 
Sector_28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
Sector_29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Sector_30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
Sector_31 Manufature of furniture 
Sector_32 Other manufacturing 
Sector_33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
Source: Own elaboration based on NACE Codes Rev. 2 
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Appendix III 
Pooled 
 
 
All data set 
H1.1 Reject 
H1.2 Confirm 
H2.1 Reject 
H2.2 Confirm 
H3.1 Reject 
H3.2 Confirm 
H4.1 Reject 
H4.2 Confirm 
H5.1 Confirm 
H5.2 Confirm 
Manufacturing companies without controlling 
H1.1 Reject 
H1.2 Confirm 
H2.1 Confirm 
H2.2 Confirm 
H3.1 Reject 
H3.2 Confirm 
H4.1 Reject 
H4.2 Confirm 
H5.1 Confirm 
H5.2 Confirm 
Manufacturing companies controlling subsectors 
H1.1 Reject 
H1.2 Confirm 
H2.1 Confirm 
H2.2 Confirm 
H3.1 Reject 
H3.2 Confirm 
H4.1 Reject 
H4.2 Confirm 
H5.1 Confirm 
H5.2 Confirm 
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Cross Section 
 
All data set 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
H1.1 Reject Reject Reject Confirm Confirm 
H1.2 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H2.1 Reject Reject Reject Confirm Confirm 
H2.2 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H3.1 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H3.2 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H4.1 Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject 
H4.2 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H5.1 Reject Reject 
   H5.2 Confirm Confirm 
   Manufacturing companies without controlling 
H1.1 Reject Reject Confirm 
 
Confirm 
H1.2 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H2.1 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H2.2 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H3.1 Reject Reject Reject Confirm 
 H3.2 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H4.1 Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject 
H4.2 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H5.1 Reject Confirm 
   H5.2 Confirm Confirm 
   Manufacturing companies controlling subsectors 
H1.1 Confirm Reject Confirm Reject Confirm 
H1.2 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H2.1 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H2.2 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H3.1 Confirm Reject Reject Confirm Confirm 
H3.2 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H4.1 Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject 
H4.2 Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H5.1 Confirm Confirm 
   H5.2 Confirm Confirm 
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